

WILMINGTON EVENING NEWS JOURNAL (DE)
28 MAY 1982

D-10

Helping Hand

Old friend surfaces as famous

I wonder if you could tell me if Bobby Ray Inman, the CIA officer that has been in the news lately, ever served aboard the U.S.S. Mullinix?

I was on that destroyer in the summer of 1961 and the CIC officer aboard was LCDR Robert Inman. He was intelligent (a Fulbright scholar), personable and from the South. I would like to know if this is the same man.

— D.M., Wilmington

One and the same.

Admiral Inman, who just recently resigned his number two post at the Central Intelligence Agency, served aboard the Mullinix from April 1960 to September 1961. He was made Lieutenant Commander in July 1961.

Deputy Director of CIA

Senate Panel Approves McMahon

By Michael Getler

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Senate Intelligence Committee unanimously welcomed and approved the nomination of John N. McMahon as deputy director of the CIA yesterday after one member cautioned that some lawmakers still do not have full confidence in CIA Director William J. Casey and thus were relying especially on the new deputy "to be straight with us."

At the same time, McMahon sought to assure the committee that new presidential orders governing CIA operations did not mean that the agency would be involved in so-called "intrusive" operations in this country involving U.S. citizens.

Asked by Sen. Walter D. Huddleston (D-Ky.) whether the panel would be informed whenever such techniques "are being used against Americans at home," McMahon said:

"I don't think the CIA will ever be involved in intrusive techniques against Americans here in the United States. Should there be such a requirement, the FBI would do that and probably with a court warrant."


McMahon's answer seemed to go beyond a prepared opening statement to the committee in which he said:

"I would like to emphasize for the record that the activities of the intelligence community involving Americans are, and must continue to be, limited, subject to strict standards of accountability and far removed from any abridgement of cherished constitutional rights."

Huddleston and others have charged that the language of the executive order signed by President Reagan last December does widen CIA authority to operate in the United States rather than strictly overseas. The intrusive techniques referred to usually mean such things as wiretapping, mail opening and searches without a warrant.

McMahon, 52, was praised by all committee members for expertise and professionalism during a 31-year CIA career. But several senators expressed the view that McMahon faced an especially "heavy burden," as Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-Del.) put it, as successor to retiring Adm. Bobby R. Inman.

Inman's surprise decision to resign, revealed last month, shocked the panel. Committee Chairman Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.) yesterday called Inman "the



JOHN N. McMAHON

best intelligence officer I have known," a compliment echoed by many members.

But Biden carried the point much further. Among Inman's other skills, he pointed out, the admiral "had a heck of a relationship with this committee."

But "... Some of us at least," Biden continued, "don't always leap to embrace the utterances of Mr. Casey as being the whole story. That may be a little unfair, and let's assume it is." But the fact remains, Biden added, that "... We sometimes wonder whether we're getting the whole truth" from Casey "or whether it's politicized."

Biden said that he and others could always count on Inman for the full story, and he and Goldwater joked that McMahon ought to learn how to pull up his socks or slide back his chair at the witness table, as Inman reportedly did on hearing other witnesses say things that troubled him.

Allegations about Casey's "politicizing" of intelligence are not new. Yet, paradoxically, Inman is known to be one of Casey's strongest defenders in terms of the director's rejection of any attempts to manipulate intelligence information.

Unlike Inman, widely regarded as an "idea man" with a good grasp of global strategy, history, politics and technical matters, McMahon is seen as strong mainly in management and technical

fields. McMahon also is credited by top CIA insiders as being the most resistant to any form of outside manipulation of intelligence.

In his statement McMahon pledged allegiance to the benefits of congressional oversight of secret CIA activities and, under questioning, promised to inform the committee if he learned that important information had been withheld or if the panel had been misled or misinformed.

He also said the CIA in June will complete a new study, ordered by the White House, to assess U.S. counterintelligence capabilities for dealing with the threat posed by foreign agents.

In a related development, the committee's former chairman, Democrat Frank Church of Idaho, warned yesterday that the United States is losing sight of earlier guidelines and the general proposition that covert operations "should be a rare occurrence."

"If we are not careful," he warned at a conference sponsored here by the Campaign for Political Rights, "we will return to past practice in which covert operations become a routine program involving literally hundreds of projects in dozens of countries."

"We will find once again that these projects, when in the aggregate, can have powerful and adverse consequences."

STATINTL

NEW YORK NEWS-WORLD

26 May 1982

Inman's warning should be heeded

Adm. Bobby Inman, the retiring deputy director of the CIA, has a well-deserved reputation on Capitol Hill as a shrewd intelligence analyst and a man not given to alarmist rhetoric.

Accordingly, we can hope that Adm. Inman's grim warning the other day about the threat posed by the Soviet Union's relentless military build-up will be heeded, most especially by those in Congress who imagine that tens of billions of dollars can be slashed from the defense budget without further eroding the nation's security.

Adm. Inman was plain spoken: "I believe the Soviet build-up over the last 17 years has brought us to a perilous state." Perilous is an unambiguous word. Its use by the nation's second-ranking intelligence official means that, in his carefully measured judgment, the United States is in danger.

Those in Congress who tend to dep-
recate that danger and to seek excuses for

cutting deeply into the Reagan administration's rearmament program cannot easily dismiss Bobby Inman's expertise, or his access to the most highly classified and sensitive intelligence.

Nor can they make light of his observation that future Soviet leaders may be "less cautious" than the septuagenarians who now hold power in Moscow. Given the Soviet Union's recent adventures in places like Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia and Southeast Asia, any informed judgment that the next generation of leaders may be bolder is chilling stuff.

The combination of Soviet military power that can even now reach anywhere in the world plus a more aggressive post-Brezhnev leadership would present the United States with unprecedented threats to its security and vital interests. The logical inference from Adm. Inman's wise counsel is that the best way to buy trouble tomorrow is to cut the defense budget today.

Admiral Inman to Inspect Sea Cadets

By Henry E. Mooberry

EDITOR

More than 400 U.S. Naval Sea Cadets from 11 east coast divisions will participate in the Second Annual Mid-Atlantic Naval Sea Cadet Personnel Inspection and Pass in Review at the historic Washington Navy Yard on Saturday, 29 May 1982.

Admiral Bobby R. Inman, USN, Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, will be the Senior Inspecting Officer. The U.S. Navy Ceremonial Marching Band and the U.S. Navy Ceremonial Guard Drill Team will highlight the ceremonies which will begin at 1 p.m. at Admiral Leutze Park at the Navy Yard.

DAHlgren Division, USNSCC, which is headquartered at the Navy Yard, is once again host for the ceremony along with its sponsor, the District of Columbia Council of the Navy League of the United States.

A native of Rhonesboro, TX, ADM Inman became Deputy Director of the CIA on 12 February 1982. In this position he is principal deputy to the Director of the CIA.

ADM Inman graduated from the University of Texas at Austin (B.A., 1950). He entered the Naval Reserve the following year and was commissioned as an Ensign in March 1952. His initial assignment was to the aircraft carrier USS VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45), which participated in operations during the Korean hostilities. His subsequent early career included a variety of assignments in Naval intelligence, including tours as the Chief of Naval Operation's Intelligence Briefer, and Assistant Naval Attaché, Stockholm, Sweden, as well as operational assignments afloat.

ADM Inman has served in a number of positions of high responsibility. He was Fleet Intelligence Officer for the Seventh Fleet in the Western Pacific, 1969-71, during the Vietnam conflict. He graduated from the National War College in 1972. He was Executive Assistant and Senior Aide to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, 1972-73. He served as Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, 1973-74; as Director of Naval Intelligence, 1974-76; and as Vice Director, Plans, Operations and Support of the Defense Intelligence Agency, 1976-77. He was appointed Director of the National Security Agency in July 1977,

where he served until March 1981. Coincident with his assignment as the Deputy Director of the CIA, he was promoted to the rank of Admiral, the first Naval Intelligence Specialist to attain that rank.

ADM Inman's many service decorations include the National Security Medal, the Navy Distinguished Service Medal, the Defense Superior Service Medal, and the Legion of Merit in addition to several awards for service during the Korean and Vietnam conflicts.


ADM Inman's permanent residence is Anaheim, CA. He and his wife Nancy (nee Russo, of Washington, DC) have two sons, Thomas and William.

Sea Cadet Divisions participating in this year's ceremonies are: ANAPOLIS Division, Annapolis, MD; BICENTENNIAL Division, Cumberland, MD; COMPTON Division, Perth Amboy, NJ; DAHlgren Division, Washington, D.C.; FRANKLIN/HOLLAT Division, Huntington, NY; LEHIGH VALLEY Division, Lehigh Valley, PA; MAINE Division, Reading, PA; NEW JERSEY Division, Bridgewater, NJ; WILLIAM E. TAYLOR Division, Wilmington, DE; TECUMSEH Division, Baltimore, MD, and TOP HATTERS Squadron, NAS Norfolk, VA.

The Naval Sea Cadet Corps consists of nearly 100 Divisions and comprises nearly 7,500 young men and women and 800 officers. Naval Sea Cadets are ages 14 through 17 and Navy League Cadets are ages 11 to 14. All personnel are volunteers. The Naval Sea Cadet Corps is the youth program of the Navy League of the United States. It is aimed at educating and training American youth in citizenship and Naval/maritime matters, Naval history and tradition, the importance of our maritime and Naval forces to our nation and world freedom, the opportunities available in Naval/maritime service careers, and at guiding young men and women toward being more patriotic, knowledgeable and responsible citizens. Participation is voluntary and there is no obligation on the part of the young men and women to join the armed forces.

The ceremonies are free, for information call 202-678-2870. The Navy Yard is located at 8th and M Streets, Southeast.

CONTINUED



More than 400 U.S. Naval Sea Cadets from 11 east coast divisions will participate on Saturday, 29 May in the Second Annual Mid-Atlantic Naval Sea Cadet Personnel Inspection and Pass in Review at Admiral Leutze Park at the historic Washington Navy Yard. Pictured are some of the 300 Cadets who participated in the 1981 Inspection. Ad-

miral Bobby R. Inman, USN, Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, will be the Senior Inspecting Officer. DAHlgren Division, which is headquartered at the Washington Navy Yard, and is host Division, is seen front and left, with components of eight other Divisions. (Photo by PH2 R.G. Ambroseno, USN)



NEWS RELEASE

OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PUBLIC AFFAIRS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. - 20301

PLEASE NOTE DATE

STATINTL

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

May 18, 1982

No. 213-82
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FLAG OFFICER ANNOUNCEMENT

Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger announced today that the President has nominated Admiral Bobby Ray Inman, U.S. Navy, to be placed on the retired list in his current grade. Admiral Inman is scheduled to retire on July 1, 1982, after completion of more than thirty years of active service. He has served as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence since February 12, 1981.

Admiral Inman was born on April 4, 1931, in Rhonesboro, Texas.

-END-



LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

'Disservice' to Mr. Haig

On Friday, April 30, The Post published a front-page story by Loren Jenkins that claimed that stories told by Miskito Indian refugees provide "the basis of Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig's charges . . . that Nicaragua was pursuing a 'genocidal' policy against its unfortunate Miskito Indian minority."

That statement is misleading. The government has provided abundant photographic evidence of the systematic destruction of the Miskito Indian villages by the Sandinista regime. This was done in an extraordinary public presentation by CIA Deputy Director Adm. Bobby Inman, and the photographs have since been released to all interested parties. An account of Adm. Inman's briefing was carried by The Post. It does the secretary of state a disservice to suggest he based his charges only on the inevitably conflicting accounts of Miskito refugees in Honduras.

MICHAEL A. LEDEEN
Special Adviser to the Secretary of State
Washington

Soviets in the Pampas

Falklands Crisis Gives Them a Solid Foothold in Argentina

By ROBERT S. LEIKEN

The Falklands crisis has turned into a bonanza for Moscow by allowing it to further a longstanding strategic objective: a military relationship with Argentina.

Until recently, the main Soviet leverage with the Argentine junta was its growing dependence on the Russian grain and meat market. Now the Soviet Union, with the help of the affluent 65,000-member Argentine Communist Party (the largest in Latin America after Cuba's), is utilizing the Falkland Island crisis to supply a hitherto missing link in its Argentine strategy: mass support for closer relations with Moscow.

Since its abstention from the U.N. Security Council's call for Argentina to withdraw from the Falklands, Moscow has lined up behind Buenos Aires. The Soviet press focuses attention on Britain's "right-wing" government, which it accuses of violating international law, while remaining silent on the character of Argentina's and its rupture of international law. Communist Party banners and slogans have been conspicuous in rallies around Argentina. The Soviet World Cup soccer team touring Argentina has also been pressed into service. Russian players rush to embrace Argentine goal-scorers, and when the Russian players are announced they receive prolonged standing ovations from the Argentine spectators.

Moscow has been wooing the countries of South America's strategic Southern Cone for more than a decade. The main recipient of Soviet attentions has been Argentina. After a decade of steadily expanding commerce, Argentina this year surpassed India

to become the Soviet Union's leading trading partner in the developing world. Moscow and Havana consistently block discussion of Argentina's human-rights violations in international forums, even as they orchestrate ostracism of Chile, Argentina's rival for jurisdiction over the Beagle Channel. When the two countries mobilized for war over the channel in 1978, the Russians publicly sided with Argentina. The Argentine junta tolerates the local, slavishly pro-Soviet, Communist Party while brutally repressing other leftist organizations. The party reciprocates with "critical support" and inventive apologies for the "progressive" and "democratic" military regime.

The Southern Cone of South America has appreciated in strategic value as aircraft carriers and supertankers have outgrown the Panama and Suez canals, and maritime traffic in the South Atlantic has multiplied. Mounting interest in offshore petroleum, in the seabed, in fishing and in Antarctica, together with the appearance of Soviet naval deployments in West Africa, have further enhanced the region's strategic significance.

More than one-third of all Argentine exports are sold to the Soviet Union. The same proportion used to go to Great Britain a half-century ago—before Argentina worked free of its hated colonial dependence. For the five decades before the junta came to power, Argentina sought to build up its industrial sector and to diversify its markets by selling light manufactured goods to Latin America and Western Europe. The junta reversed this policy, favoring the agricultural exports of the oligarchy and prostrating the industrial sector. Argentine critics of the junta claim that its policy has turned back the development clock, creating structural dependence on the Soviet market and facilitating Soviet penetration.

In Third World countries like India, Iran and Cuba, Moscow has used economic blackmail to wrest further concessions. Even before the Falklands crisis, the Soviets were slowing down their payments for Argentine goods and urging Argentina to reduce the huge imbalance in Soviet-Argentine trade by buying Russian. Moscow now supplies Argentina with turbines and generators for several critical power projects, and is providing the Argentine nuclear program, the most advanced in the region, with critical components such as enriched uranium and heavy water.

Moscow clearly desires to build this eco-

nomic relationship into a strategic-military one. A new fishing agreement now lets Soviet "scientific" vessels operate out of strategic Ushuaia, off the Beagle Channel. The Soviet Union has been hawking military equipment to the Argentine generals for years. Last fall, the junta contemplated the purchase of Soviet warplanes. Inside the anti-communist Argentine officer corps are those who listen to Soviet blandishments with sympathy. Some have studied at the Leningrad military college and participated in now-commonplace military exchange missions with their Soviet counterparts. To reinforce these ties, the Soviets carefully cultivated relations with Argentine growers, exporters and financiers.

The Argentine elite has so far resisted Soviet efforts to forge a military link. They stressed their loyalty to what a senior U.S. official called our "shared values," when testifying on behalf of resumption of U.S. military sales to Argentina last May. British and U.S. reaction to the invasion of the Falklands may allow the Soviets to hurdle that obstacle. They are now reportedly supplying surveillance data and submarine monitoring equipment from their base in Cuba.

As Adm. Bobby Inman, deputy director of the CIA, told a Senate subcommittee earlier this week, the growing relationship between Argentina and the Soviet Union is a "major cause for worry." Should Argentina be humiliated, its Soviet sympathizers, now with popular backing, will argue that the United States has proved its unreliability, and that only Soviet military assistance will protect Argentina from its enemies and enable it to regain its national honor.

An Argentine-tilt toward Moscow would make an ironic footnote to the Reagan Administration's policy of "drawing the line" in Central America. When the Administration enlisted the junta in its Central American anti-communist crusade, it assumed that the generals' indispensability in our "backyard" would be proof against fallout from an adventure in the Falklands. Now this bastion of Western values is the hottest new candidate for Soviet military assistance. The Argentine experience demonstrates again that anti-communism does not necessarily make for anti-Sovietism.

Crisis Called Likely to Spur Soviet-Argentine Trade

By CLYDE H. FARNSWORTH

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 12.—Adm. Bobby R. Inman, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, says that one outcome of the Falkland crisis may be to turn the Soviet Union into an arms supplier of Argentina in return for Argentine wheat and beef.

He described the possibility as a "major cause for worry" in the United States, adding that "I think you will find the Soviets eager to sell at bargain prices." The obstacle to such a development in the past, he said, was Argenti-

na's lack of interest.

Until its seizure of the Falklands April 2, Argentina had depended on Western Europe, Israel and the United States for arms supplies, but these sources have now been cut off.

Admiral Inman, making one of his rare Congressional appearances in open session, testified Tuesday before a Senate investigations subcommittee on the implications for Soviet military power of the acquisition by Moscow of Western and Japanese technology. Admiral Inman announced his resignation last month, but he is not expected to leave his post until around July 1.

He said the failure to stop the outflow of this technology had placed the United States in a "perilous" position in dealing with expected Soviet challenges in the 1980's.

American officials have already reported that Argentina was looking for alternative sources for such arms as the French-built air-to-surface missile that wrecked the British destroyer Sheffield.

Admiral Inman was the first official to suggest openly that Moscow's need for hard currency to buy food could be

linked to Argentina's need for arms.

Admiral Inman said that rather than embark on any new research and development programs, the Soviet Union had undertaken a "very thorough vacuum-cleaning" of Western and Japanese technology to improve its fighting power at greater speed and lower cost.

Very Substantial Efforts

He disclosed that a recent defector "documented very substantial efforts" by the Soviet Union in Japan. Admiral Inman described Soviet intelligence activities in the United States and Western Europe as "intense" and called for substantially better coordination between intelligence and other Federal agencies to deal with the problem in the United States.

He said he would give a "very high priority" to stopping the export of high-technology products from the United States that specifically help Moscow build sophisticated weapons.

The C.I.A. has reported that 70 percent of the acquisitions of militarily useful technology have been accomplished by the Soviet and Eastern European intelligence services, using clandestine, technical and overt collection means. The remaining 20 to 30 percent came through legal purchases and open-source publications or from other Soviet organizations, such as the Ministry of Trade. Only a small portion came from direct technical exchanges conducted by scientists and students.

Admiral Inman told the hearing that the new generation of Soviet leaders "may not be as cautious as the old generation of Bolsheviks."

Asked by Senator Sam Nunn, Democrat of Georgia, about implications of financial pressure on Moscow, Admiral Inman predicted that in 10 years the Russians would still have economic and agricultural problems but that "they will continue to protect their investment in the military sector. Therefore, we must pay more attention to ever more sophisticated weapons systems."

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FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM The Today Show

STATION WRC-TV
NBC Network

DATE May 12, 1982 7:30 A.M.

CITY Washington, D.C.

SUBJECT Admiral Inman Comments on the Falkland Crisis

CHRIS WALLACE: Here in Washington, CIA Deputy Director Bobby Inman told a Senate subcommittee there is concern that the Falklands crisis may push Argentina toward the Soviet camp.

ADMIRAL BOBBY INMAN: You have fingered a very major worry I have, that the outcome of this crisis will be a decision on the part of an Argentine government to embark on a substantial program of acquiring new military hardware in a broad way from the Soviet Union.

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Media disbelief rapped by outgoing CIA biggie

By JOSEPH VOLZ

Washington (News Bureau)—Adm. Bobby R. Inman, retiring deputy director of the CIA, said yesterday that it is difficult to convince the public of the peril of a Soviet military buildup because the press will not believe United States intelligence reports, even when they include "spy satellite pictures."

"If one doesn't want to believe there is a Soviet buildup, then one can find other kinds of questions to divert attention," said Inman, who added that he had been particularly irked at press coverage of



Adm. Bobby R. Inman

an intelligence briefing last March on the Soviet and Cuban-backed military buildup in Nicaragua.

John Hughes of the Defense Intelligence Agency conducted the briefing, showing reporters photographs taken from spy satellites of Soviet-type military garrison arrangements, lengthened airport runways to accommodate Soviet-made Mig fighter-bombers, and deployed Soviet T-55 tanks.

Inman, who said he regards Hughes as the best photo interpreter around, said he was surprised to see the newspaper accounts of the briefing next day use a word like "alleged" in discussing the intelligence findings.

Inman, testifying before the Senate Permanent Investigations Subcommittee, said the public will not be convinced of an increase in Soviet strength "if there is no willingness (by reporters) to accept the honesty of the professional."



ADM. BOBBY R. INMAN
sees "cause for worry" about weapons

Soviet-Argentine Ties Called a Possibility

Associated Press

The United States is concerned that in the wake of the Falklands crisis, Argentina may embark on a "substantial program" of obtaining new weapons from the Soviet Union, the CIA's deputy director said yesterday.

Adm. Bobby R. Inman told a Senate subcommittee that such a possibility "is a major cause for worry in the months ahead."

Inman's remarks appeared to go further than Reagan administration officials have previously in public statements, in pointing specifically to the prospect of Soviet-Argentine military ties growing out of Argentina's confrontation with Britain.

Inman said that if such an arms supply relationship develops, along with it would come increasing Argentine dependence on Soviet military advisers and spare parts.

Inman, who will retire from the CIA July 1, appeared before the Senate governmental affairs investigations subcommittee primarily to testify about problems in controlling leaks of sensitive U.S. technology to the Soviet bloc.

A government study now being carried out on the technology transfer problem, Inman said, is likely to lead to recommendations for a "very substantial input of manpower" to help bolster the FBI's counterintelligence force.

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4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20015 656-4068

FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM Morning Edition

STATION WAMU-FM
NPR Network

DATE May 12, 1982 6:15 A.M.

CITY Washington, D.C.

SUBJECT Inman Comments on the Falkland Crisis

BOB EDWARDS: Yesterday the Deputy Director of the CIA, Admiral Bobby Inman, told a Senate subcommittee that Argentina may turn to the Soviet Union for weapons as a result of the Falklands conflict. Argentina's previous suppliers, the United States, Europe and Israel, have refused to sign new contracts since the invasion of the Falklands. And Inman said, "I think you will find the Soviets anxious to sell at a bargain price."

With news that Soviet reconnaissance planes have spotted part of the task force, we have a report on Argentine-Soviet relations from Chris Hedges in Buenos Aires.

CHRIS HEDGES: Since the invasion, one of the strongest defenders of the move to retake the Falklands outside of this country has been the Soviet Union. The Soviet news agency Tass has issued a stream of reports that brands the British as colonial aggressors; and during Secretary of State Alexander Haig's negotiations portrayed the American diplomat as manipulating the situation in favor of Britain.

It is suspected by many observers here that the Argentines are receiving practical help from the Soviets during the crisis and can turn to the Soviets if they need to buy arms.

While this regime claims to be anti-communist and killed 20,000 of its own people in an avowed war on Marxism, Argentina sells most of its grain to the Soviets. And when this crisis began, there were 20 Soviet ships in the port loading grain and another 20 off the coast waiting to receive shipment.

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Soon after the islands were taken, the Soviet Union and Argentina signed an agreement to exploit the protein-rich krill around the Falklands.

The Argentines have used their relationship to the Soviets as a threat, always painting the picture of an abandoned Argentina forced by their cruel friend, the United States, into the arms of the Russians. Many government officials here are quite fond of quoting Winston Churchill's line about making alliances with the devil if need be to save their country.

The ties with the Soviets have been growing and will continue to grow after this crisis. During a recent soccer match between the Soviets and Argentina, the Russian team was given an enthusiastic standing ovation.

Anti-communism in Latin America is always a rhetorical convenience used to justify the silencing of any opposition, rather than an ideological stance. And the Argentines are one of the prime examples.

CIA official fears Argentines will try to buy Soviet weapons

From Inquirer Wire Services

WASHINGTON — The United States is concerned that Argentina will respond to the Falkland Islands crisis by moving to buy new weapons from the Soviet Union, the CIA's deputy director said yesterday.

Adm. Bobby R. Inman told a Senate subcommittee that such a possibility "is a major cause for worry in the months ahead." Inman, who will retire July 1, made the comments before the Senate governmental affairs investigations subcommittee.

Inman's remarks appeared to go further than Reagan administration officials previously have in pointing specifically to the prospect of Soviet-Argentine military ties growing out of the confrontation with Britain over the South Atlantic islands.

"I think they will find the Soviets very eager to sell — and at a bargain price — particularly if that can lower the amount of hard currency they have to spend to get access to Argentine wheat and beef," Inman said.

After the United States announced on April 30 that it was backing Britain in the Falklands crisis, Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. noted that "communist adversaries seek positions of influence on the mainland of the Americas."

Inman, in response to questioning by Sen. Lawton Chiles (D., Fla.), noted that the Argentines have bought most of their modern weapons from Western Europe and "have not previously indicated any interest in procuring Soviet hardware, even though Peru was acquiring a great deal of it."

"But you have fingered a very major worry I have — that the outcome of this crisis will be the decision on the part of an Argentine government to embark on a substantial program of acquiring new military hardware, in a broad way, from the Soviet Union," Inman told Chiles.

Inman said if such an arms relationship develops between Moscow and Buenos Aires, Argentina would experience increasing dependence on Soviet military advisers and spare parts.

Press accounts of Soviet-Argentine military cooperation have included reports that the Soviets are sharing intelligence data — gathered by satellites, reconnaissance aircraft and electronic eavesdropping ships — on the movements of the British fleet.

In other developments yesterday:

- The Pentagon refused to discuss details of possible materiel aid to Britain in the crisis. Pentagon spokesman Henry Catto said he could neither confirm nor deny whether decisions have been made to provide the materiel support for British forces that Haig had announced would be forthcoming.

- In Paris, Deputy Secretary of State Walter Stoessel said the United States would assist Britain short of sending American troops. He said

American backing of Britain "in this difficult and deplorable problem" had hurt U.S. relations with Latin America, but Washington believed there would be understanding among Latin American countries of the principles involved — especially the principle "not to recognize aggression."

- Pope John Paul II will cancel his planned visit to Britain if hostilities with Argentina have not ceased by the middle of next week; Cardinal Basil Hume said yesterday. Hume, Roman Catholic primate of England and Wales, said the visit — scheduled to last six days, beginning May 28 — "would be difficult for the Holy See ... in sad circumstances."

- U.S. ambassador-at-large Vernon Walters, in an indirect reference to British Prime Minister Margaret

Thatcher, said Monday that the "machismo of women" is playing a role in the "silly war" over the Falklands.

- Prince Philip, the outspoken husband of Queen Elizabeth II and a keen conservationist, said yesterday that the British fleet off the Falkland Islands may be mistaking whale echoes for Argentine submarine signals and, as a result, many whales may have been killed.

- Three British journalists jailed by the Argentine government on spying charges completed a month behind bars yesterday with little hope for immediate release. Simon Winchester, a reporter for the Sunday Times; Anthony Prime, photographer for the Observer, and Ian Mercer, a reporter for the Observer, have been kept virtually incommunicado in recent days.

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FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM Eyewitness News

STATION WDVM TV

DATE May 11, 1982 6:00 PM CITY Washington, DC

SUBJECT Admiral Inman Comments

MAUREEN BUNYAN: The outgoing Deputy Director of the CIA today warned the Senate that the United States is in a perilous position because of a massive buildup of Soviet military power. Admiral Bobby Inman's comments came before a hearing on the flow of advanced military technology to the Soviet Union.

Inman said future Soviet leaders may be less cautious than current officials in challenging the U.S. He warned that such a lack of caution could lead the Soviets to underestimate the strength of the U.S., causing a crisis in the years ahead.

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FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM CBS Evening News

STATION WDVM-TV
CBS Network

DATE May 11, 1982 7:00 P.M.

CITY Washington, D.C.

SUBJECT Admiral Inman Comments on the Falkland Crisis

DAN RATHER: The United States' number two intelligence officer said today that the Falklands conflict could stimulate Argentine military ties with the Soviet Union. The CIA's Deputy Director, Admiral Bobby Inman, told a Senate subcommittee that this, quote, is a major cause for worry in the months ahead.

The warning by Inman, who retires from the CIA July 1st, appears more ominous than any other Reagan Administration statement on the conflict's possible aftereffects.

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✓ News Bulletin

STATINTL

11 May 1982

Item #1

W053

RW

CIA-ARGENTINA-SOVIETS

WASHINGTON (AP) -- ADM. BOBBY R. INMAN, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE CIA, SAID TODAY THE UNITED STATES IS CONCERNED THAT IN THE WAKE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS CRISIS ARGENTINA MAY EMBARK ON A SUBSTANTIAL PROGRAMM OF OBTAINING NEW MILITARY HARDWARE FROM THE SOVIET UNION.

SUCH A POSSIBILITY WAS A MAJOR CAUSE FOR WORRY, IT INMAN TOLD A SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE.

INMAN, WHO WILL RETIRE JULY 1, MADE THE COMMENTS UNDER QUESTIONING BY SEN. LANTON CHILES, D-FLA. CHILES ASKED HOW INMAN VIEWED THE CHANCES OF ARGENTINA GETTING SOVIET ARMS IN RETURN FOR GRAIN AND MEAT EXPORTS TO THE SOVIETS.

IN RESPONSE, THE CIA OFFICIAL NOTED THAT THE ARGENTINES HAVE NOT PREVIOUSLY INDICATED ANY INTEREST IN PROCURING SOVIET HARDWARE. EVEN THOUGH PERU WAS ACQUIRING A GREAT DEAL OF IT. BUT YOU HAVE FINGERED A VERY MAJOR WORRY I HAVE -- THAT THE OUTCOME OF THIS CRISIS WILL BE THE DECISION ON THE PART OF AN ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT TO EMBARK ON A SUBSTANTIAL PROGRAM OF ACQUIRING NEW MILITARY HARDWARE, IN A WORDS, RW, FROM THE SOVIET UNION, IT INMAN TOLD CHILES.

HE ADDED, "I THINK THEY WILL FIND THE SOVIETS VERY EAGER TO SELL -- AND AT A BARGAIN PRICE -- PARTICULARLY IF THAT CAN LOWER THE AMOUNT OF HARD CURRENCY THEY HAVE TO SPEND TO GET ACCESS TO ARGENTINE GRAIN AND BEEF."

INMAN APPEARED BEFORE THE SENATE GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE PRIMARILY TO TESTIFY ABOUT PROBLEMS IN CONTROLLING LEAKS OF SENSITIVE U.S. TECHNOLOGY TO THE SOVIET BLOC.

HE SAID HE EXPECTS THAT A STUDY OF THIS PROBLEM NOW UNDERWAY WILL LEAD TO RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A "VERY SUBSTANTIAL INPUT OF MANPOWER" TO HELP BOLSTER THE FBI'S COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE FORCE.

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ON PAGE 31

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
11 May 1982

Letters to the Editor

Support for Admiral Inman

Your April 23 editorial concerning Admiral B. R. Inman's resignation as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence prompts several comments.

First, you suggest that Admiral Inman, once Director of the National Security Agency, was hardly a leading protector of civil liberties. Without the Admiral's strong support, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the statute regulating the approval of national security wiretaps, would not now be law. Further, the strong procedures which now govern all U.S. government signals intelligence activities are direct testament to Admiral Inman's recognition that protecting legitimate privacy does not harm intelligence missions but rather keeps them free of dangerous and unnecessary diversions.

You further suggest that, again as Director of NSA, Admiral Inman somehow ignored Soviet deceptions. That does a serious disservice to the good name of this nation's finest professional intelligence officer. Every action taken by him during the lifetime of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence suggests rather that clearheaded and oftentimes forward-looking recognition of problems has been the Admiral's trademark.

Finally, you suggest that, as a professional, Admiral Inman would not have qualified for the post of Director of Central Intelligence because personal loyalty to the

President is the final test for this political appointment.

The post is a political one. Its incumbent serves at the pleasure of the President. That is as it should be. The top intelligence post is an important one. A President should always have the ability to effect a change in intelligence policy or organizational structure. But the chief loyalty that a DCI should have is not to the political survival of the President, but to the truth. The Secretaries of State or Defense, whom everyone recognizes to be political figures, can elucidate a President's policies. What the DCI and the intelligence community must do is provide independent analyses. That is a nonpartisan function. The nation can accept or reject a President's foreign policy but it must depend on the accuracy and impartiality of the intelligence which exists to support policy.

Our last three Presidents have appointed DCIs whose terms were or seem likely to be coincident with theirs. That is a departure from previous practice and an unfortunate one. I hope that future Presidents do not pass over outstanding professionals like Admiral Inman. His kind are greatly needed by this nation.

EDWARD P. BOLAND

Chairman
Committee on Intelligence
House of Representatives

Washington

U.S. Science Secrets: Little to Steal, Much to Lose

By DANIEL S. GREENBERG

The Reagan Administration's efforts to screen unclassified research from prying foreign adversaries might usefully be examined by recalling Robert Frost's passage: "Before I built a wall I'd ask to know/What I was walling in or walling out."

Looked at that way, recent overt curbs on visits by Soviet Bloc researchers and subtle curbs on visits by Japanese researchers, plus demands for restraints on publication of "sensitive" scientific papers, reflect delusions of scientific omnipotence that are inconsistent with America's actual position.

Weep not for the American scientific enterprise, for it is strong in all important disciplines and the leader in many. However, to an extent that the curtain-closers ignore, science has bloomed elsewhere. The result is that we have a lot of company on scientific frontiers that we dominated for many years. That company, even when politically friendly, is not inclined to collaborate with the Administration's myopic scheme for drawing its scientific wagons into a circle.

While the Reaganites assume that we've got the scientific goods and thus can choose whether to share them, the fact is that the United States accounts for a surprisingly small proportion of the world's scientific output in the disciplines at the heart of military and industrial power. That share has steadily declined as other countries have expanded their scientific programs.

Publication of scientific papers is an indicator of scientific prowess. In physics, our share of papers has declined to about 20% of the world's total, the National Science Foundation reports. In chemistry, we're down to about 20%; in mathematics, 40%.

Though research papers vary widely in scientific significance, papers produced abroad are satisfying a stiff standard. In increasing numbers, they're winning competition for scarce space in tightly screened American scientific journals. For example, foreign papers on physics in these journals increased from 4,100 to 6,000 between 1973 and 1979 (the last year for which data are available). In that period, American articles in foreign physics journals declined slightly.

With scattershot edicts, various government agencies have sought to bar foreigners from otherwise open university laboratories, apparently unaware that sizable fields

of academic science would intellectually and financially wither without foreign students and teachers. For example, with Americans lured by high industrial salaries, more than half the Ph.D. candidates in our engineering schools are foreigners, as are nearly half the postdoctoral researchers in physical sciences. Both groups are major sources of teachers and researchers in academe.

It is legally possible to drape a security veil over campus laboratories, screen out foreign staff and restrict publication of "sensitive" research. But such tactics, even if selectively applied, as Adm. Bobby R. Inman, the retiring CIA deputy director, recommends, are so inimical to the healthy functioning of research that some of the Defense Department's senior scientists are worried about hardline zealots running free. Thus, a Defense Science Board study has warned that if the Pentagon "vigorously attempts to regulate the flow of scientific information in the scientific community, it could jeopardize the strength and vitality of the very community it is seeking to revitalize for the sake of national security."

The Administration seems to find comfort in outdated conceptions of Soviet scientific backwardness. In many fields, the Russians indeed lag behind the West, to a large extent because of the obsessional secrecy that hobbles their scientists. But, as Frank Press, president of the National Academy of Sciences, has pointed out, in other fields—for example, electrometallurgy, nuclear fusion, physics, and mathematics—the Soviet Union has achieved "world class" status. Nevertheless, America has nearly abandoned its best means for looking inside Soviet science: the traffic back and forth, now virtually ended, of Soviet and American exchange-program scientists.

Roald Hoffman of Cornell University, a Nobel laureate who has lectured on chemistry in the Soviet Union, argues that "it is essential for the security of our country that we have people with firsthand knowledge of the workings of the Soviet system."

But, high on foolish notions of where we stand in the scientific world, our protectionists go on with their wall-building.

*Daniel S. Greenberg is editor and publisher of *Science & Government Report*.*

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ON PAGE 7

U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
10 May 1982

A Big Challenge For New CIA Head

As John N. McMahon takes over the No. 2 spot in the United States intelligence community, he faces one overriding challenge—to reassure Congress that America's spy apparatus is under firm control.

President Reagan named McMahon, 52, to the post on April 26, only days after the highly respected Adm. Bobby Ray Inman resigned as deputy director of intelligence.

McMahon, who joined the Central Intelligence Agency fresh out of Holy Cross College in 1951 and has headed each of the major elements of the agency, is now executive director of the CIA, in charge of its day-to-day operations.

In his new post as deputy to Director William J. Casey, McMahon will be responsible not only for the CIA but for the entire 10-billion-dollar-a-year U.S. intelligence apparatus, which includes everything from human agents to high-flying spy satellites.


Key members of Congress have expressed misgivings about Casey, a millionaire lawyer and entrepreneur who served as Reagan's campaign director. Since Casey's experience as an intelligence officer was in the no-holds-barred days of World War II, lawmakers say they slept better at night knowing that Inman was there to help mind the shop.

McMahon's professional credentials are beyond challenge.

Still, confirmation hearings in the Senate will test whether he has the political savvy to deal with Congress and the muscle to resist those who want the CIA to conduct more risky, covert operations overseas and resume spying at home.

Inman stood up to such pressures—but in doing so he had to fight bruising bureaucratic battles that helped persuade him to retire.

Inman also set in motion a major effort to modernize the intelligence apparatus. As it stands now, he says, the system is good enough to rule out another surprise attack like Pearl Harbor but is only barely capable of dealing with the uncertainties of the '80s and '90s. The job of making the needed improvements now falls largely to McMahon and his boss, Casey. □



John N. McMahon

Walter Scott's Personality Parade

Q. *Have you ever heard of Task Force 157? It's supposed to be this nation's most super-secret intelligence agency. Yet we, the American taxpayers, have never been told of its existence. Can you tell us who runs it?—T.L., Washington, D.C.*

A. Task Force 157 was a secret intelligence unit run by the U.S. Navy that employed agents operating under business and commercial covers. It was riddled with incompetency and venality and was abolished in 1976 on the recommendation of Adm. Bobby Inman, then chief of naval intelligence and now deputy director of the CIA. The notorious Edwin P. Wilson, the former CIA agent who went to work for Col. Muammar Qaddafi of Libya, was associated with Task Force 157. Inman explained the sorry history of that particular spy network at a closed session of the House Intelligence Committee, so that while we taxpayers may not know about it, our representatives in Congress do.

EDITORIAL

INMAN IS OUT, C.I.A. AND F.B.I. VIE TO SPY

Not since Roger Baldwin's memorial service have we heard so many civil libertarian accolades heaped on one citizen as drenched Admiral Bobby Inman when he quit the Central Intelligence Agency over "policy differences" last week.

It is, we suppose, retrospectively reassuring to be told that the former head of the National Security Agency (whose mission is to electronically eavesdrop on and otherwise invade the privacy of our enemies) is a closet civil libertarian, even as it is dispiriting to hear how little confidence so many senators have in Inman's boss, C.I.A. chief William Casey. Forgive us, then, our skepticism at the (leaked) reasons for his departure.

Inman bailed out, we are told, because he disagreed with a never-adopted proposal drafted by the National Security Council staff to "re-organize" U.S. counterintelligence activities by creating a central agency that would take over management of the responsibilities now in the hands of the C.I.A. and the F.B.I.

If the proposal was indeed turned down, why did he resign? And given the disinformation apparently endemic to all intelligence operations, why would the agency have leaked that the reorganization had been disapproved unless it had been approved?

Too convoluted? Perhaps. After all, the fight is not one of principle but one of jurisdiction—not whether, but rather which one of our intelligence agencies will have the privilege of spying on Americans. Maybe when General Haig is finished with the Falklands he can do some mediating closer to home. Eavesdropping on Americans is, after all, an area in which he has some expertise.

What is wrong with US intelligence activities

By William V. Kennedy

Whether or not Adm. Bobby Inman resigned as deputy director of the US Central Intelligence Agency as a "matter of principle," what is now known of some of the disputes that marked his tenure make it plain that America's troubles with intelligence are far from over.

Of most immediate concern is an effort by National Security Council staff members, reportedly resisted by Admiral Inman, to create "Big Brother" right on schedule for 1984. This was to have been a "super" counterintelligence agency that would have combined the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the counterintelligence staff of the CIA with a computerized data bank, thereby creating the potential for intrusion into every household in the country.

It is as if the investigations of the mid-1970s, with their disclosures of drug experiments on unsuspecting Americans, collusion with the Mafia in assassination plots, and an unrelieved series of national disasters and humiliations bred of misguided "covert action," never had occurred.

What the reemergence of the monstrous counterintelligence idea tells us is that the basic flaw revealed by the Church committee in the Senate and other congressional investigators has not been corrected. In short, despite the expenditure of literally hundreds of billions of dollars during the past 30 years the United States does not have a reliable intelligence service.

What it does have is a set of competing intelligence bureaucracies. In terms of the nature of the activities in which they are engaged, the most questionable are the covert action and counterintelligence staffs of the CIA.

"Covert action" as currently established in the CIA has nothing remotely to do with intelligence, understood any way you choose to read the word. It is a form of warfare first institutionalized in the World War II office of Strategic Services involving sabotage, execution of opposition leaders, and psychological warfare.

It should have been obvious from the start

that for a democratic society to pursue such activities short of a state of war is to risk corruption of its own free institutions. It is no accident that former CIA operatives involved in the Watergate conspiracy came from the covert action staff.

There was some justification for keeping a small "OSS" in the Defense Department as a planning staff only, but the beginning of the Cold War led to the surreptitious insertion of the leftover OSS covert action staff into the then newly created CIA. In that hothouse of secrecy the covert action "camel" grew to such proportions that, as the Church committee found, it came to dominate the agency.

"Counterintelligence," as the term implies, is essentially a negative function: It seeks to block foreign espionage but in the process it can produce some useful information. Thus the principal contribution of the CIA counterintelligence staff has been to identify and "turn" Soviet agents abroad into sources for US intelligence.

Like a police vice squad, however, counterintelligence staffs run a constant risk of being corrupted by the very practices they are supposed to be fighting. Pressure from the CIA counterintelligence staff for an internal US control system more "efficient" than that of the Soviet KGB has waxed and waned for years and apparently has surfaced once again in the form of the National Security Council "Big Brother" concept.

"Intelligence," as such, tends to be the first victim of such an approach, primarily because the patient gathering, sifting, and assessment of information — the essence of true intelligence — seems much too dull for the American psyche. It is more exciting to be a "doer" chasing after foreign spies or consorting with the Mafia to poison Mr. Castro's soup.

Also indicative of the American preference for "hands-on" technology rather than "philosophy" (defined as any sort of abstraction) is the superb technical collection system built up in the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency (NSA). Although nominally coordinated by the Director of Central Intelligence these are, in fact, quasi-independent agencies tightly and

jealously controlled by the secretary of defense and their respective chiefs.

The DIA's satellites and reconnaissance aircraft can take pictures of literally anything on earth. The NSA can eavesdrop on most of the world's electronic communications. The CIA's counterintelligence staff abroad and the FBI at home can track down enemy spies (as well as keep a jealous watch on each other).

What the US cannot do with any consistency is make sense out of what it all means. In part this is due to the crowding out of the assessment function of the CIA by the counterintelligence and covert action activists. It has ignored centuries of British experience and current practice that show competent intelligence assessments to be the product of individuals, not of committees. America's national assessment system is based on one suffocating committee on top of another all the way from the regional directorates of the CIA and DIA to the National Security Council.

That problem is compounded by the practice of recruiting analysts direct from the college campus on promises of good pay and lifetime job security. Anyone who thinks people such as that are going to take risks — the essence of competent intelligence assessment — plainly never has worked for the US government. Interestingly enough, Israeli intelligence experienced its first major failure, in the 1973 October war, after it adopted the CIA practice of using advanced degrees rather than performance as its primary staffing and promotion criteria.

Ray S. Cline, formerly of CIA and now of the Georgetown Center for Strategic Studies, has proposed that the CIA approach to intelligence be discarded in favor of an institute that would devote itself to producing true intelligence, largely in the open and without the excess baggage of covert action. We would do well to look into that idea, at least as a start.

William V. Kennedy is a military journalist who has served as an intelligence officer in the Strategic Air Command and for 14 years as a member of the US Army War College.

STATINTL

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ON PAGE 5.

GUARDIAN (U.S.)
5 May 1982

CIA's No. 2 man leaves over policy disagreements

Concern surrounds Inman resignation

By ELLEN DAVIDSON

The resignation of Adm. Bobby Inman, the No. 2 man at the CIA, was apparently based on policy disagreements with the Reagan administration, particularly over domestic spying. The White House announced Inman's decision to resign April 21, saying only that he planned to enter private business.

While hardly the civil libertarian he has been portrayed as in some media accounts of his resignation, Inman evidently did have reservations about the revival of proposals to form a superagency cutting across jurisdictional lines of existing intelligence organizations, possibly including creation of a central records system that would be a threat to civil liberties. This scheme was first suggested in early 1981 by a Reagan transition team on intelligence, but was later scrapped. Early this year, however, Reagan gave his approval to a review of these proposals, which also include upgrading counterintelligence activities.

Inman, a former head of the National Security Agency and of Naval Intelligence and former vice director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, also expressed disagreement last year with the extent to which Reagan planned to turn the CIA loose to spy on U.S. citizens, a role normally reserved for the FBI. But although he predicted that the final version of Reagan's executive order on intelligence activities would contain no provisions for domestic CIA spying, when the document, signed in December, included greatly expanded domestic powers for the agency, he defended the new regulations and claimed they were actually quite limited.

Inman also had no qualms about the Intelligence Agents Identities Protection Act, a bill now passed by both houses of Congress which would outlaw the disclosure of names of U.S. intelligence agents, even if the information leading to the discovery was already public. Inman backs that legislation, as well as a proposal to exempt the CIA from the Freedom of Information Act.

And in January, Inman warned a meeting of scientists that if they did not voluntarily submit some of their sensitive papers to government review prior to publication, regulations on the flow of information might ensue. "Clearly we cannot allow our vital

technological lead [over the Soviet Union] to be whittled away simply because we refuse to take the time and trouble to try and strike a balance between the demands of academic freedom and the needs of national security," he told the Association of Former Intelligence Officers in March.

Inman's announced resignation caused concern among members of congressional intelligence committees. Richard Lugar (R-Ind.), a key figure in the Senate Intelligence Committee, said April 23, "We've looked to Adm. Inman. He's been our man."

Members of Congress view Inman's superior, William Casey, as a rather unprofessional agency director who earned his post through being Reagan's campaign manager rather than through any particular expertise in the field of intelligence. This sentiment was reinforced last year when Casey's crony Max Hugel, whom the CIA director had named deputy director for operations, was forced to resign over reports of questionable stock market dealings. Casey himself came under investigation at the time and came through with a not-too-enthusiastic "not unfit" to serve verdict from the Senate intelligence panel.

Moves to force Casey's departure as well in that period were quashed by reports from the White House that not only would Inman not succeed Casey, but the admiral might be fired too.

Senate Intelligence Committee chairman Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.) said Casey was "a fine man, ... a real spy when he was with the Office of Strategic Services [the World War 2 predecessor of the CIA], a real guy with a dagger. But we do it differently now and he is not a pro." Lugar said the CIA encompassed "complexities that would take more years to understand than Casey will be alive."

Inman himself reportedly thought Casey overly fond of adventurous but ill-advised CIA operations abroad. Sen. Joseph Biden Jr. (D-Del.) noted, "Without [Inman] the intelligence agencies may be given license to try all kinds of questionable things here and abroad." But given Inman's record of backing for Reagan's proposals for the intelligence community, including the vastly increased CIA budget, it is unlikely that the admiral would have served as much of a



Bobby Ray Inman.

check on such activities.

On April 26, in a move that is expected to reassure Congress, Reagan named John McMahon as Inman's probable successor. Currently the No. 3 man in the CIA and former head of its covert operations division, McMahon has put in 31 years at the agency.

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ON PAGE 17A

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
5 MAY 1982

Inman's

The CIA loses a giant

By Edwin M. Yoder Jr.

WASHINGTON. — Wave-making resignations are frowned upon in this city and Adm. Bobby Inman followed form when he quietly resigned, last month, as deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

But when the resignee is, in the souped-up words of an Inman profile in the May Playboy, "our 'smartest spy' ... the shadowy genius of CIA," speculation is unavoidable.

The Playboy hype is largely nonsensical, but few departures have disturbed thoughtful people as much as Inman's.

Inman's own explanation leaves no doubt that he is, in part, another casualty of the arbitrary ceilings on top government salaries that too often expose gifted public servants to financial lures in the private sector — especially as their children near college age.

But few of Inman's close associates believe that he is leaving primarily for personal or financial reasons. He has been the top man, compiling a brilliant record, in two other critical intelligence functions: the Navy's and, more recently, the National Security Agency's. He was a consensus choice, among intelligence professionals, for the top job at CIA, later if not now, and agreed to serve as number two only at President Reagan's personal request.

Reagan's choice was his campaign manager, William Casey, and Inman has gallantly denied that there is or was personal friction. Nonetheless, Casey is a White House insider and it is in the White House that Inman's chronic detractors have their lair.

Inman has not earned their love or pleasure by successfully resisting certain amateurish and politically naive attempts to "unleash" the CIA in ways sure to revive the destructive quarrels of the mid-Seventies over "domestic spying" and designs equally sure to undo his own quiet efforts to rebuild an intelligence capacity stricken by congressional inquisitions.

The Senate Intelligence Committee last fall (it later pronounced him



"Too late, Diogenes,
Bobby Inman just quit!"
"not unfit" to continue as CIA head), Inman's Senate supporters thought his time might be coming. But word went out from the White House that if Casey were pushed out, Inman would not succeed him.

It's hard to keep a gifted and experienced professional by assuring him that his way to the top is sealed and barred. (Inman may also have been a victim of the suppressed Bush-Reagan staff rivalries at the White House.)

Inman's approaching departure, though he is to be replaced by a respected CIA hand, John McMahon, leaves a vacuum in the top leadership in the intelligence community.

Reagan's appointment of Casey, with his hoary credentials as a World War II OSS officer, may not be in the California's-horse category of frivolity. But it was the most dubious since Nixon and Kennedy made their campaign managers attorney general.

Casey, 69, is widely regarded as out of date and out of touch with congressional opinion, erratic in judgment and inept at administration and making his views or purposes clear to anyone. Friendship with the President gives him secure anchorage at the White House. But at the State and Defense Departments, and on Capitol Hill, he is seldom seen and not seriously regarded.

With Casey largely out of it, Inman

is of the National Security Agency (which gathers signal intelligence). Inman learned from wire intercepts in March, 1980, that Billy Carter was wheeling and dealing with the Libyans — illegally, it appeared, since he was not registered as a foreign agent.

When Inman's first notification of superiors was unavailing, he took the violation directly to the Justice Department, as regulations required. Thus in a collision between duty and bureaucratic caution, he followed the book: even in a sensitive matter implicating the President's family.

More recently, Inman has publicly advocated self-restraint by U.S. scientists whose free play with sensitive technology offers easy espionage windfalls for the Soviet Union. His candid pleas for voluntary restraint did not endear him to scientists. But as a man of intellect, sensitive to the vulnerabilities as well as the strengths of the open society, his open handling of a hot subject was impeccably — and typically — professional.

Inman's departure will leave several controversies still hanging, notably a dispute over the organization of counter-intelligence. Some of the administration's "hotshots" want counter-intelligence (a function now divided between CIA and FBI) severed from other intelligence functions and centralized in a separate bureau. This idea is regarded as dreadful by Inman and other pros.

Clearly a man like Inman should be on his way up, not out. But his detractors at the White House, now gloating in bureaucratic victory, prefer "personal loyalty" to professionalism. In intelligence word, personal loyalty is of dubious relevance. It is not the duty of the nation's intelligence chief to cushion the bad news about some cockeyed foreign enterprise.

With Inman cannot be imagined doing.

CIA Is Bugged by Hints of 1

By DAVID WISE

The resignation of Adm. Bobby Ray Inman as the No. 2 man at the Central Intelligence Agency may serve a useful purpose if it revives the debate over controlling the agency.

The very existence of the CIA, the FBI and other intelligence arms poses a continuing dilemma for all Americans: whether secret intelligence machinery can ever be made compatible with democratic government. These agencies perform vital tasks but are so powerful that they also pose a threat to the constitutional liberties they were created to protect.

At the very least, the departure of the widely respected Inman should alert us to the fact that all is not well "out in the woods," as CIA agents sometimes refer to their headquarters across the Potomac in pastoral Langley, Va.

A year ago, when a draft of a new presidential order on intelligence leaked to the press, Inman told the Senate Intelligence Committee that he did not favor changes that would permit the agency to conduct covert operations in the United States or to spy on Americans at home. "The job of the CIA is abroad," he said. He told the press that he might resign if "repugnant changes" were adopted.

Last December, President Reagan signed the new order, and sure enough, for the first time in history, it permitted the agency to conduct covert operations in this country and to spy on Americans at home. Inman had lost. Former CIA director Stansfield Turner, who is not known as a far-out radical, warned that the Reagan order would permit unwarranted "intrusion into the lives of Americans."

Even before Reagan signed the executive order, the White House had made it clear in a leak to the press that if the controversial William J. Casey stepped down as CIA director, Inman would not be named to replace him. (Presidents complain only about unauthorized leaks to the press.) Blocked off from the top job, frustrated by a series of bureaucratic battles, including the fight over the executive order and over a more recent plan to create a new agency for counterintelligence, it was not surprising that Inman—having already threatened to quit—would accept a six-figure offer from the private sector. He will now be free to speak out from the sidelines, and may hope to become CIA director some day.

Perhaps his resignation will help to puncture the myth that has grown up around the agency in recent years. During the 1970s, in the wake of Watergate, the press and congressional investigations disclosed a series of incredible abuses and illegal acts by the intelligence agencies. It was revealed that

the CIA, using Mafia hitmen, had plotted the assassination of foreign leaders, tested drugs such as LSD on unsuspecting American citizens, routinely opened first-class mail in violation of the law, read cables and spied on Vietnam War protesters (sometimes even using spy satellites in outer space to photograph demonstrators).

Following these disclosures, so the myth goes, there was a series of legislative reforms and presidential orders that seriously hobbled the intelligence agencies, including the CIA. So now it is time to "unleash" the CIA and the other agencies and remove the restrictions that are endangering our security.

The only trouble with this perception is that it is not true. No legislation was passed to reform the agencies by creating charters to restrict and define their authority. Bills to do that were introduced in 1978 and 1980, but they did not pass. President Jimmy Carter did issue an executive order advising the CIA not to go around assassinating people.

Congress, it is also true, did pass a law in 1978 requiring court warrants for most bugs and wiretaps. And in 1980, Congress enacted another law declaring that it was entitled to information about the intelligence agencies, including advance notice of most covert operations. But the same legislation reduced from eight to two the number of committees to which the CIA must report, a change the agency wanted. Such was the extent of "intelligence reform."

The pendulum in fact has swung very far in the favor of the intelligence agencies. Aside from Reagan's "Big Brother" executive order, both houses of Congress have passed a bill that would jail reporters who disclose information that reveals the "identities" of intelligence agents, broad-brush legislation that, had it existed in 1972, might have prevented the press from reporting that most of the Watergate burglars had CIA backgrounds, and that one was on the agency's payroll at the time of the break-in. In addition, the agency is pushing for a law to exempt it completely from the Freedom of Information Act.

There was one beneficial result from the intelligence scandals of the mid-1970s. The Senate and House created permanent committees on intelligence and, along with the press, they offer the public the best hope for monitoring the CIA.

Congress is in no mood, however, at least while President Reagan is in office, to consider broad reform legislation for the intelligence agencies. If undertaken at all, that task will not be accomplished until after 1984. But of course, if George Orwell is right, by that time it will be too late.

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David Wise is the co-author of "The Invisible Government" and the author of "Spec-
ulum," a novel about the CIA.

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NEWSWEEK
3 May 1982

A Quiet Departure at CIA


Bobby Ray Inman was always a reluctant deputy. As head of the National Security Agency when the Reagan Administration took power, he made no secret of his lack of interest in the No. 2 job at the Central Intelligence Agency. He changed his mind and accepted only after a personal appeal from the President himself.

Last week President Reagan accepted Inman's resignation as CIA deputy director "with deep regret." It was clear that the four-star admiral—the first major defector from the Reagan Administration's national-security ranks—had no regrets about leaving the CIA's bridge. He insisted that his resignation, which will take effect as soon as a successor is named, was for personal reasons, suggesting that, at 51, with one son in college and a second in prep school, it was time to seek six-figure comfort in the private sector. But sources close to Inman say he was increasingly disenchanted with Administration plans for the CIA and was feeling increasingly frustrated in a professional relationship with CIA director William J. Casey that was never warm and was frequently frigid.

No Stomping: Much of Inman's displeasure centers on what he calls "petty bureaucratic intrigue," including the occasional leaking of intelligence secrets for political effect. A prime example occurred when the White House confirmed the existence of U.S. covert operations against Nicaragua, a deliberate leak designed to show the President taking a hard-line stand against the Sandinista government. "That blew Inman's mind," says a source close to him. He was also appalled by the Administration's obsession with covert operations—including both those he believed should be overt

and those he viewed as reckless adventures—and angered by the time and energy he spent quashing them. According to one friend, Inman explained that he was quitting now "because I don't want to go out of here stomping my feet."

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But while Inman has occasionally bucked the Reagan Administration's hard-liners, he has more often abided by the party line. On the most fundamental issue of all—the size of the intelligence budget—he was wholly in tune with the Administration. He has supported government clearance of technological-research reports that might prove useful to the Soviet Union, and he has endorsed the exemption of the CIA from the Federal Freedom of Information Act. He has also supported the reclassification of once secret government documents and mandatory lie-detector tests for staff throughout the national-security apparatus. "I have always considered myself a conservative," he says.

Reagan is likely to miss Inman most on Capitol Hill. At his confirmation, one senator said that "if there ever was unanimous consent and enthusiasm, this is it"—and in his fourteen months in office, Inman has done nothing to diminish that affection.

"Casey mumbles and shoots the bull, while Inman is a straight shooter," says a source in the intelligence community. "Now the Reagan Administration has lost its credibility. They can't rush Bobby Ray over to cool the waters." Indiana Republican Richard Lugar, a key member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, was miffed that the President sat on Inman's resignation for a month without informing legislators, and demanded that Congress be consulted before a replacement is named. "He's been our man . . . in a way," Lugar said. "Who are we going to call? Who has our trust?"

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Still, given the highmarks that Inman has received for his performance, few in the intelligence community would be surprised if he returns to a national-security job in some future Administration. "I'm not going to make any Shermanesque statement," Inman said. But, he added, "this isn't a

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ON PAGE 3

BOSTON GLOBE
3 MAY 1982

Magazine named CIA gets into trouble

Covert Action is a target of recent legislation

By Paul Aaron
Special to The Globe

WASHINGTON — The magazine's activities have been denounced by the New York Times as "despicable." Jack Anderson said that "the people who put it out have great connections with communist intelligence agencies." Congress eventually legislated curbs on what one senator, John Chafee of Rhode Island, referred to as "the illegitimate press."

The periodical that provoked these broadsides is Covert Action. In its three years of publication, its campaign to thwart clandestine operations by the US intelligence community has included listing the names of hundreds of CIA undercover agents.

To defend against this perceived danger, Congress last month passed a bill making anyone revealing the identity of an agent, "with reason to believe such identification would impair or impede the foreign intelligence activities of the US," liable to 10 years in prison and a \$50,000 fine.

The law's sponsors commend it as a vital safeguard, but opponents are organizing to try to get it overturned on constitutional grounds. Civil liberties groups say the evidence necessary for prosecution under the law is subjective to the point of being open-ended. They believe it contains an implicit threat to First Amendment rights that may intimidate reporters investigating CIA abuses.

Ellen Ray, Bill Schapp, and Lou Wolf, who run Covert Action from a cluttered, minuscule office in the National Press Club Building in Washington, make no attempt to conceal their political sympathies. Their collective experience provides a map of the

radical movement in recent years.

Friendship with Philip Agee galvanized a commitment to "Third World liberation struggles," which the three already shared. Agee, a CIA case officer for 13 years, broke ranks with the agency in 1975. He said that while he was with the agency he took part in systematic secret efforts to manipulate and destabilize forces for social change in other nations and to preserve authoritarian regimes attentive to US interests.

Agee's crusade to reveal the inner workings of the CIA was joined by Ray, Schapp and Wolf. The three editors (Agee is now in exile, his passport revoked by the State Department) hope exposure will alert intended CIA targets abroad, and compromise agency attempts to penetrate and influence foreign countries. In addition, Covert Action aims to galvanize the US public so it will scrutinize CIA methods.

"The CIA's original charter from 1947, which spoke about the need to gather intelligence, sift through it and get the facts to the President, has long since been abandoned," Ray said in an interview. "Today, other government agencies do the bulk of data retrieval and analysis. The CIA's role is action-oriented: paramilitary operations, the rigging of elections, the subversion of governments."

According to Wolf, such covert mechanisms increasingly supplant, rather than supplement, diplomatic open channels. As the trend continues, Wolf believes, the Reagan Administration increasingly will seek to restrict opportunities for the public in the United

foreign countries and debate the issues.

"What's happening today goes well beyond whether we're able to identify agents in our magazine," he said. "We've stopped that practice pending a court decision, but our magazine really hasn't been affected, since naming names is only a very small part of what we do. The overall context is a growing official disrespect for First Amendment rights."

As evidence of "an ominous pattern," he cites:

- The recently proposed "executive order on classification," which will not only expand the prerogatives of the government to withhold documents previously available to the public, but also will permit the reclassification and recall of data already released to scholars, journalists and citizens through the Freedom of Information Act.

- Departing CIA Deputy Director Bobby Inman's view that if the US scientific community fails to police itself, and the "hemorrhaging of Western technology" to the Soviets persists, the government may regulate both the conduct of research and the availability of its findings.

- Dire warnings by Attorney General William French Smith of an "insidious" Soviet "disinformation" offensive, along with statements by President Ronald Reagan and others implying that those who march against US policy are unwitting dupes of the Kremlin.

"The balance between the people's right to know and considerations of national security is being overturned," Schapp said. "The current Administration has adopted concealment as a style."

The CIA Loses Its Top Brain

Is America's intelligence community, which has had smooth sailing since Ronald Reagan took office, headed for a stormy new period of controversy?

That was the fear expressed in Washington after an April 21 announcement that Adm. Bobby Ray Inman, 51, deputy chief of the Central Intelligence Agency, will leave the CIA this summer to join private industry.

Senator Joseph Biden (D-Del.) spoke for many in Congress: "Inman believed the nation can have both effective intelligence agencies and civil liberties. Without him, the intelligence agencies may be given license to try all kinds of questionable things both here and abroad."

Inman's efforts to head off proposals to permit domestic spying by the CIA and his skeptical view of risky covert ventures overseas involved him in running battles with Reagan's national-security staff. The fights took their toll, even when Inman won. Said a CIA official about his resignation: "He had just used up his patience with internecine warfare. It was starting to bother him."

Inman was rewarded with the fourth star of a full admiral when he agreed to Reagan's request to become deputy to CIA Director William Casey, who had managed the President's campaign.

Inman, then head of the code-breaking National Security Agency (NSA), made it clear he would remain only for a limited time to help revitalize an intelligence operation that had lost funds, manpower and prestige in the 1970s.

In accepting Inman's resignation, Reagan said the admiral leaves the intelligence community "in a strengthened and enhanced posture."

How smooth the CIA's future course will be depends on how well Inman's successor can reassure Congress that the agency won't become a "rogue elephant," as it was once described. Among top candidates for the job were John McMahon, who has been running the CIA's day-to-day operations, and Air Force Lt. Gen. Lincoln Faurer, who succeeded Inman at the NSA.

Many lawmakers think Inman will be a hard act to follow. Said Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.): "Nobody can match him in the intelligence business."



Inman

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 23.

NEWSWEEK
3 May 1982

A Quiet Departure at CIA

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"Casey mumbles and shoots the bull, while Inman is a straight shooter," says a source in the intelligence community. "Now the Reagan Administration has lost its credibility. They can't rush Bobby Ray over to cool the waters." Indiana Republican Richard Lugar, a key member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, was miffed that the President sat on Inman's resignation for a month without informing legislators, and demanded that Congress be consulted before a replacement is named. "He's been our man ... in a way," Lugar said. "Who are we going to call? Who has our trust?"

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3 May 1982

The retiring admiral testifying at a House committee hearing

Vanishing Act by a Popular Spook

Bobby Inman leaves the CIA, claiming the reasons are personal

Members of Congress serving on committees that keep an eye on the CIA have long faced a tricky challenge. Short of employing truth serum or lie detectors, how can they know when officials of an agency trained in the art of deception are dissembling? One such CIA watcher on the House Intelligence Committee swears he discovered an infallible method. Whenever CIA Director William Casey was testifying in secret meetings, the Congressman watched the feet of Casey's deputy, Admiral Bobby Inman. If the admiral shuffled his feet or reached down to pull up his socks, the Congressman concluded that Inman knew that his boss was shading the facts. Sure enough, when questioned, the admiral would delicately correct the director.

If Inman's telltale fidgeting was subconscious rather than intentional, it was one of his few professional imperfections. In Washington's atmosphere of political intrigue, most high CIA officials develop more enemies than friends. But when the White House last week announced Inman's impending retirement from both the CIA and the Navy, the praise for the four-star admiral was downright gushy. Democratic Congressman Edward P. Boland, chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, called Inman "the nation's finest professional intelligence officer." Democratic Senator Joseph Biden even called Inman "the single most competent man in the Federal Government."

Inman's bipartisan popularity stems largely from his straight talk and incisive mind. His dogged persistence and workaholic habits pushed him to the top of a career in military intelligence: director of Naval Intelligence from 1974 to

1976 to 1977; director of the National Security Agency, 1977 to 1981.

As head of the NSA, a supersecret agency that uses satellites, sophisticated monitoring techniques and more employees (more than 20,000) than the CIA (some 16,000) to gather intelligence information, Inman developed considerable rapport with congressional committees. When President Reagan was looking for a CIA chief in late 1980, Inman was pushed hard by diverse Capitol Hill backers, most notably Republican Senator Barry Goldwater. Instead, Reagan picked Casey, who had been his campaign director. A bit reluctantly, Inman left NSA to become Casey's deputy. Reagan talked him into it, he said, with "the smoothest job of arm twisting I've ever encountered."

Why was Inman, 51, now leaving the CIA? The admiral told TIME that he felt he had accomplished what he had set out to do at the agency: "Get a road map created for a long-range rebuilding program all across the whole intelligence community." Having done that, he insisted, he was stepping down to build a second career in private business, earn enough money (he now gets \$59,500) to put two teen-age sons through college, and spend more time with his family. Admitting that his career had involved "wretched work habits and hours," Inman said his eldest son had asked last Christmas: "Where's the quality of life in all this?" That, said Inman, was "a thoughtful question."

ing periods of my entire life. I found the invidious comparisons both unfair to Bill and embarrassing to me."

Inman often clashed with the staff of Reagan's National Security Council, particularly with former National Security Adviser Richard Allen. One quarrel was over an Executive order supported by the NSC that would have given the CIA broad authority to spy on U.S. citizens at home when they were linked to "significant foreign intelligence" operations. Inman did not publicly object to this domestic CIA role, but he did oppose giving the CIA a free hand in the types of activities it could probe and the methods it could use. Largely because of his efforts, the order was tightened to put clearer limits on what the CIA could do at home.

More recently, Inman was said to have been upset by White House leaks that sought to buttress Administration policies in Central America and especially by the contention that the Soviet Union and Cuba were behind the trouble in Nicaragua and El Salvador. Although Inman generally shared the Administration's thesis, he felt that its disclosures about U.S. surveillance of the region compromised CIA intelligence-gathering methods.

At the White House, some presidential aides suspect that Inman's friction with Allen, who quit in January after disclosure that he had accepted gifts from a Japanese magazine, spilled over into hostility between Inman and Casey, since Casey and Allen had long been allies. Inman concedes that the "air might have had a little strain in it" when Casey was being investigated and Inman was seen as a successor, but he insisted, "The personal working relationship has been very easy from the start."

Beyond that, said the admiral, "all the stories that are running around about major policy differences and personality disputes are just plain false." He contended that he was involved only in the routine kind of conflicts that always go on in Government and that they had nothing to do with his resignation. Unfortunately, Bob Boland, who was in a telephone conversation, was not in a position to determine whether he was hitching up his socks as he spoke.

—By Ed Magnuson



CIA Director Casey

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ON PAGE 7NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
2 May 1982

KGB

How Soviet spies are stealing our secrets

By LAURENCE MCQUILLAN
and JOSEPH VOLZ
The News Washington Bureau

HAT POLITE, bearded young man striking up a street corner conversation in flawless Russian or Ukrainian in Brighton Beach these days may be an FBI agent.

The FBI wants the 20,000 or so recent Soviet immigrants living in what is now called "Odessa-on-the-Atlantic" to know that the bureau wants to make friends.

It's all part of the FBI's stepped-up campaign to halt Soviet intelligence services from recruiting spies among emigres here and to slow down the Reds' near-wholesale theft of U.S. military technology.

"You could call our approach in Brighton Beach a sort of 'Officer Friendly' program, like the police have used," said R. Jean Gray, New York special-agent-in-charge of Soviet counter-intelligence. Gray says the idea is that the Russian- or Ukrainian-speaking agents—recruited for the detail because they grew up speaking those languages at home—"will get to be known like cops on the beat."

"The new arrivals shouldn't consider the FBI to be the local equivalent of the KGB," Gray said.

Presumably, harassed new immigrants will contact their friends at the FBI if the KGB comes calling. Just how the emigres, often refugees from persecution by the huge KGB apparatus back home and subject to not-so-veiled threats about relatives still living in the old country, will react to the arrival of a new investigative group—even one as smooth as the FBI—is uncertain. There are Soviet refugees who are convinced that any cop, whether assigned to the FBI or the KGB, is a good guy to avoid.

But there are others only too willing to turn in a neighbor as a KGB suspect, whether he is or not. Just like it used to be done back home.

And it's up to a small force of FBI counter-intelligence agents—only several thousand nationwide—to sort out the fact, fiction and fears.

Among the typical complaints the bureau has handled in the New York and Washington area:

- After a KGB defector testifies before a congressional committee on Capitol Hill he is approached by a correspondent of the Soviet newspaper Izvestia in a Senate hallway and told: "Your friends back in Moscow are wondering how you are doing." The defector reports this encounter to the FBI field office and later complains that the bureau does not seem all that excited about his complaint.
- The family of a young New York woman is worried about the Russian emigre who is dating their daughter. They fear the young man is a KGB agent because he is seen having coffee with a Soviet United Nations official. They call the FBI.
- Invariably, emigres who arrive with more money than the usual are viewed suspiciously by older immigrants who believe they must be KGB agents. One such new arrival, who identified himself as a KGB defector, became interested in the myriad of anti-Communist Russian organizations in the New York area. But the 80 or so members of the various groups immediately became suspicious of the defector when he scheduled a "unity" meeting among the democratic and monarchist groups at a hotel auditorium that can seat up to 1,000 persons.

"He deliberately tries to embarrass us with the press," said one disgruntled member. That may or may not be so, but again it was a tough one for the FBI.

NE THING that plagues most immigrants, particularly those who have defected from the KGB, is the fear that they are being followed and watched by KGB agents in this country. Sometimes that is true, but often it is not.

For example, Vladimir Sakharov, a third generation Soviet intelligence agent, went to work for the CIA in the 1970s as a double agent in the Middle East. After a time, he was relocated on the West Coast of the United States, far from his previous theater of operations, but he never got over his fear of possible Soviet reprisal.

In his book "High Treason," he tells of his early days in Los Angeles when he was being watched day and night by a KGB agent stationed across the street from his Hollywood motel.

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The Nation

In Summary

C.I.A. No. 2 A Technical Man

The earth rumbles when a top Central Intelligence Agency job switches hands, even if the agency's demeanor stays mostly the same.

President Reagan named an intelligence veteran, John McMahon, to succeed Adm. Bobby Inman as C.I.A. deputy director last week. The appointment was meant to mollify Congressional concerns about the agency's professionalism and, as such, is not expected to bring policy shifts.

Mr. McMahon is highly regarded as a manager and technician, but lacks the outside constituency needed to be an effective policy advocate. Given Adm. Inman's unusual bipartisan support in Congress, his successor will have big shoes to fill. Moreover, Adm. Inman told the American Newspapers Publishers Association last week that United States foreign intelligence is "marginally capable."

The Senate Committee on Intelligence has had a "troubled 18-month relationship" with the Administration over some of its C.I.A. appointments, observed committee member Daniel Patrick Moynihan. The forced resignation last year of Max Hugel as chief of covert operations fueled criticism of Director William Casey. With a debate about C.I.A. secrecy and domestic spying growing, the President and Mr. Casey quickly tapped the experienced, apolitical McMahon.

Michael Wright
and Caroline Rand Herron

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ON PAGE 10CHICAGO TRIBUNE
2 May 1982

Top spies push expert to watch over CIA chief

By James Coates

Chicago Tribune-Press Service

WASHINGTON. — Intelligence community insiders will press hard to elevate a CIA expert on Soviet nuclear weapons to a top job in order to prevent CIA Director William J. Casey from incorporating a partisan bias in agency reports, The Tribune has learned.

The behind-the-scenes move to make R. E. Hineman, head of foreign intelligence assessments at the CIA, is the latest in a series of efforts to keep Casey, a major political operative in President Reagan's campaign, from politicizing agency reports.

The CIA reports are crucial to U.S. foreign and military policymakers, who use them to determine such things as Soviet military intentions, the accuracy of Soviet weapons, and potential successors to Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev.

Casey's detractors have long warned that the 69-year-old conservative was ordering subordinates to slant their reports to reflect his personal hardline views.

THE RECENT SURPRISE resignation of Adm. Bobby Ray Inman as Casey's deputy revived these concerns by such key leaders as Sen. Barry Goldwater (R., Ariz.) and Rep. Richard Lugar (R., Ind.).

In the wake of Inman's resignation, Lugar and Goldwater — widely viewed as hardliners themselves — stunned many agency insiders by publicly accusing Casey of lacking objectivity.

Lugar, a former Navy intelligence officer, said that "there are simply complexities involved (in preparing assessments) that would take more years than Bill Casey has" to grasp.

Goldwater said bluntly of Casey: "He is not a pro."

Sending an obvious signal to the White House and to CIA headquarters, both senators warned that their past support of Casey was given grudgingly and only because Reagan made Inman, a 51-year-old career intelligence professional, Casey's No. 2 man.

The administration moved quickly last week to mollify Lugar, Goldwater and other members of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees by naming as Inman's successor John McMahon, who had been in charge of preparing the reports assessing Soviet and other foreign adversaries' future behavior.

McMAHON, A VETERAN of the CIA and its recent bureaucratic shakeups, was a welcome choice to the congressional critics, sources on Capitol Hill said.

McMahon had been shuffled about at the CIA early in the Reagan administration during the disastrous effort to install a political ally of Casey, Max Hugel, as chief of the agency's covert operations.

Hugel, a sewing machine importer, directed Reagan's political campaign in New Hampshire and became a close friend of Casey.

Intelligence professionals expressed dismay when Casey placed Hugel in charge of covert operations, the CIA branch that includes all the agency's clandestine operations abroad.

Hugel resigned last summer in a furor over charges that he manipulated stock sales and was replaced by John Stein, a seasoned intelligence expert who served as station chief in Cambodia in 1971 and 1972.

REACTING to the Hugel scandal, the agency drastically reorganized its top command. McMahon was named executive director, and a bright young careerist, Robert Gates, became chief of foreign assessments, with Hineman as his deputy.


There now are strong indications that Gates, one of the fastest-rising CIA men in the agency's history, will become executive director, leaving his intelligence assessment post open.

Fierce bureaucratic in-fighting has erupted in a drive to get Hineman into Gates' vacated position.

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2 MAY 1982Pat Oliphant
Universal Press Syndicate

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CIA

Watchdog departs

WASHINGTON, DC

It is not that Admiral Bobby Ray Inman is a great civil libertarian, a sceptic about the American intelligence agencies, or one who could be counted upon to leak information about their abuses to the press or the public. It is just that he has been seen as a professional, non-political intelligence officer, a kind of watchdog among Reagan administration appointees who are very political indeed. Admiral Inman's presence as deputy director of central intelligence was thus reassuring to those who felt uneasy about Mr William Casey, a political crony of the president who is the director; and so it is that Mr Inman's sudden, unexpected resignation has stirred concern.

The admiral says that he wants to enter private business, to run something, and make more money in order to afford a college education for his teenage sons. But there are two other interpretations of his departure. One is that what he really wanted to run was the Central Intelligence Agency and that he chafed in the number-two position under Mr Casey, having already been in charge of the National Security Agency (which is concerned primarily with electronic and other technical means of intelligence-gathering). In fact, Mr Inman was the choice of Mr Barry Goldwater and other members of the senate intelligence committee to run the CIA; but, as it became clear that the various revelations about Mr Casey's complicated financial affairs would not be his undoing, Mr Inman's hopes faded.

The second interpretation of Mr Inman's decision is the more troubling one. It holds that he was opposed to a plan by Mr Reagan (or, more precisely, by some White House aides) to review and reorganise American counter-intelligence policy and operations. Mr Inman and


others who agreed with him apparently worried that the review would lead to the creation of a new counter-intelligence agency that would have a mandate to collect information within the United States, and to the development of a central records system that, by some accounts, would pose a threat to civil liberties. These are sensitive issues precisely because the CIA—exceeding its formal legal authority—did some of those same things during the 1960s and early 1970s. Many of the questionable CIA operations were dismantled during the Ford and Carter administrations, and some of Mr Reagan's aides are frank about wanting to restore them.

Mr Inman took pains to deny that his departure had anything to do with such policy debates. But it is a sign of how much distrust congress and the press still feel towards the CIA that his announcement stirred such intense discussion. The White House moved quickly to dampen the excitement by announcing the appointment of another intelligence professional, Mr John McMahon, as Admiral Inman's successor. Not much is known about Mr McMahon's politics or his position on the issue of domestic counter-intelligence, but one of his assets is that he has held jobs in many different parts of the CIA and thus knows its strengths and its weaknesses. (In the arcane world of intelligence, however, that can also be regarded as a disadvantage, since Mr McMahon has no clearly identifiable body of support within the agency, nor any powerful political allies on Capitol Hill.) Confirmation hearings on his appointment will give the senate another chance to investigate how far the Reagan administration is attempting to go in the area of domestic intelligence.



Inman's out

MAYBOY
MAY 1982



*bobby ray inman is known around washington as the
shadowy genius of cia—a spook so shrewd that no
one's sure if he's sinister or sincere*

article

By ROBERT SAM ANSON

ILLUSTRATION BY GARY RUDDELL



EARLY ONE MORNING not long ago, a group of the nation's defense and intelligence leaders rose from their beds, kissed their wives and families and, jaws set, went out to fight World War Three. In simulation, that is.

Out over the treacherous terrain of U. S. 95 they trekked, until at last, some distance from Washington, they attained their objective: the U. S. Naval War College. While the sun peeked over the trees and security men watched nervously, they manned their computer consoles and braced for action.

On the Blue Team, representing the United States, were arrayed some of the best brains in the strategic business. There were generals and admirals, CIA men and a Secretary of Defense, a veritable *Who's Who* of the military establishment. Their Red Team opponents, representing the nuclear might of the Soviet Union, were a less prepossessing lot. Especially their leader.

He was a tall, slender man, almost gawky. He wore horn-rimmed glasses and had a large, high forehead of the kind that freckles in summer. He did not appear dangerous. Indeed, were it not for the admiral's uniform he was wearing—an ill-fitting garb from which it seemed the hanger had not been removed—he might have been taken for a schoolteacher (which, in fact, he had been before he joined the Navy). Compared with the company around him, glittery in its gold braid and determination, he was an improbable figure, and his smile, which flashed frequently, was most improbable of all. It was big and toothy and there was a gap between the leading incisors. Altogether, it made him look not so much like a schoolteacher and even less than an admiral; standing there, amidst all that brass, he seemed like nothing so much as Huckleberry Finn. His name was Bobby Ray Inman.

The game commenced. Back and forth the simulated superpowers battled, sending their computerized scenarios this way and that. Missiles flew, bombers bombed, ships sailed, armies marched, whole countries disappeared. The tension in the room was electric. Hunched

over one console, a member of the Joint Chiefs turned suddenly ashen. Out of nowhere, the nukes were on their way.

On it went, hour after harrowing hour, and when it was over, when the world lay in pseudo cinders, there was egg of the most highly classified nature on the face of the United States. Said one awed participant, a former Secretary of Defense, of the man who had put it there, the admiral with the Huck Finn grin: "I'm just glad that guy's on our side."

You hear that a lot in Washington about Bobby Inman. "The right man in the right job at the right time," Barry Goldwater, the chairman of the Senate intelligence committee, calls him. James Schlesinger, the former Secretary of Defense, terms him "a national asset." To Senator Joe Biden, the liberal Democrat from Delaware, he is "the most quality guy in the Federal Government." Former CIA director Richard Helms commends him for his "brilliance"; a Helms successor, William Colby, for his "integrity." Major General George J. Keegan, Jr., the fire-breathing former chief of Air Force Intelligence, likes him for his "guts"; Birch Bayh, for his "brains"; Walter Mondale, for his "wisdom." And then there are those, like a former deputy director of the National Security Council, who say, quite simply, "Bobby Inman is the smartest man in uniform." And who, after a thoughtful pause, add, "Maybe out of uniform, too."

All this about an improbable man few people outside Washington have ever heard of. In Inman's profession, the anonymity is welcome. Bobby Ray Inman, you see, is a spy.

His official title is deputy director, Central Intelligence. What he does is everything. It is Inman who runs the agency's day-to-day operations; Inman who coordinates the activities of the "intelligence community"; Inman who prepares the critical "national intelligence estimates"; Inman who evaluates the data flowing in from spy satellites; Inman who protects CIA from flak on Capitol Hill; Inman who has the next-to-last word on every CIA undertaking.

from plane to plane, from the secret service of a Hungarian vice-premier to shipping arms to the Afghan rebels. He is, in the very deepest sense, the man who keeps the secrets.

One of those secrets is who Inman is. The places he has worked—CIA, NSA, DIA, ONI, the whole alphabet soup that is American intelligence—will say nothing and none with more eloquence than CIA. “The admiral is keeping a low profile,” an agency spokesman says. “We aren’t going to help you with anything.” CIA, however, does provide an official biography. It consists of exactly one unrevealing paragraph. It states that he was born, 50 years ago, in Rhonesboro, Texas—a town that, according to Southwestern Bell, does not exist. The biography also says he attended the University of Texas, graduating in 1950 with a liberal-arts degree. A check with the university’s alumni computer reveals no such person. Nor, unsurprisingly, is there any listing in any Washington, D.C., area telephone book for a Bobby Ray, or B., or B.R., or, for that matter, any Inman. James Jesus Angleton, the fabled former head of CIA counterintelligence, is listed. Yes, Angleton whispers, he knows Bobby Inman. Then the line goes dead.

Inman has no hobbies or outside interests. He does not go to baseball games or cocktail parties. He rarely, in fact, goes anywhere, except to the office. The principal exception is when he is called to Capitol Hill to testify before one or another of the intelligence-overight committees, whose hearings are conducted in secret. Around Washington, he has few close associates (“If someone as lowly as a three-star admiral wants to see him,” says one, himself a four-star, “it had better be damned important”) and even fewer friends. “Bobby,” as one spook puts it, “is not the kind of guy you talk over your bowling scores with.” Of the handful of people who claim to know him well, most could not say whether he smokes or drinks (negative, in both instances), even whether he is married (he is, happily) or has children (he has, two: both boys). Indeed, out of 50 interviews with people who have worked with him over the years, ranging from former CIA directors to his superiors in the Navy, only one knew the name of his wife. It is Nancy, and, like her husband, she is said to be very quiet.

It has been anything but quiet, however, since Inman came to CIA. There have been behind-the-scenes battles, exposés in the press, questions about the agency’s links to Libyan-backed assassins, continued conflicts with Congress and calls for director William Casey’s resignation. One way or another, they have all involved Bobby Ray Inman. A prime-

and, in the case of the Senate, a bitter struggle over CIA’s new executive order, an engagement that, before it was through, would shake the agency, threaten the Bill of Rights and nearly cost Inman his job.

It all began in early 1981, a few weeks after Inman’s confirmation hearings. The hearings themselves had been a love feast, with one Senator after another congratulating Inman on his extraordinary fitness for his new job. The only noteworthy moment came toward the end of the session, when Inman was asked to comment about reports that CIA and the White House would soon seek to undo restrictions the Carter Administration had placed on the agency with regard to domestic spying. Inman’s answer was direct; he was against the Administration move. As Inman put it: “I would not elect to carelessly walk away from the safeguards we have so carefully crafted together. These rules are to protect U.S. citizens, not anyone else, and I believe that we need to continue to protect them.”

But even as Inman was speaking, plans were afoot to undo those safeguards. They surfaced, finally, in March, with the leak of the draft of a proposed executive order, which, once Ronald Reagan signed it, would allow CIA not only to engage in domestic spying but to infiltrate domestic dissident organizations, carry out clandestine wire taps and conduct “warrantless searches” (“black bag jobs,” in agency parlance)—in sum, all the Operation Chaos capers that had gotten CIA into trouble with Congress in the first place. Inman, who’d had a hand in drawing up the Carter protections before going to CIA, was livid. Almost immediately, he was back before Congress, denouncing the new plan as a “third-level working staff paper” and pledging anew that “CIA’s job is abroad.” Lest anyone miss his point, he then invited reporters to CIA’s headquarters and, in a rare, on-the-record briefing, vowed to resign if alterations were made to CIA’s charter that he found “personally repugnant.” The draft was withdrawn and, shortly thereafter, its author, CIA general counsel Daniel Silver, left the agency.

But that wasn’t the end of it. Three months later, another proposal, this one far more protective of civil liberties, was floated and just as quickly shot down, apparently because it was *too* protective. Then, last fall, a third and final draft made its appearance. Less Draconian than the first, more hard-line than the second, it still offered possibilities for domestic spying. Civil libertarians and not a few Senators were alarmed, and Inman shared their concern. At one point, during a secret Senate briefing with CIA counsel Stanley

Inman made his feelings deviously plain. According to a Senator who was present, when Sporkin discussed provisions of the order that would allow domestic spying, Inman flashed a “thumbs-down” sign; when the Senators booted in on Sporkin, Inman winked and beckoned with his hand, “More, more.”

“Bobby is the conscience of the agency,” one Senator said afterward. “Without him, the deluge.”

General Keegan, was blunter: Bobby Inman, he said, with admiring relish, “knows how to keep the whores at bay.”

It was an extraordinary performance, but then, nothing about Bobby Inman has ever been ordinary. He is an admiral who grew up on the plains of East Texas. He is a regular career officer who did not attend Annapolis. He is a technician who never studied engineering. He is an intelligence specialist in a Service where, by regulation, only “blue water admirals” can hold the most senior commands. He is, in fact, one of the very rare non-Annapolis, non-blue-water, full, four-star admirals in U.S. naval history, and undoubtedly the only one anywhere who can discuss the rhythms of Thackeray and Swinburne as knowledgeably as he can the exact disposition of the Soviet Baltic fleet.

The only thing about him that is ordinary is his name. It is not Robert but, in the manner of tailbacks for East Central Oklahoma State, plain Bobby, simple and folksy. He lives like a Bobby: strictly no frills. According to his financial statement filed with Congress at the time of his CIA appointment, his only income, apart from his Navy salary and interest from a credit union and a handful of U.S. Savings Bonds, derives from the rental of a modest four-bedroom house, on which the bank holds a mortgage of less than \$100,000. Inman himself resides in typical military accommodations in suburban Virginia. The only thing that separates him from his middle-class neighbors is the presence of Navy-supplied stewards. The stewards, who are a perquisite of his rank, assist in the preparation of Inman’s sole known passion: the ritual of elaborate, multicourse breakfasts.

He barely has time to eat them. Most mornings he is up at four to begin poring through the remains of the work he has lugged home the night before. By seven, he is at his functionally Spartan office at CIA’s McLean, Virginia, headquarters, having read the overnight cable traffic during the chauffeured ride to work. Unless there is a call to the Hill (where he is liked) or the White House (where he is not), he will remain there, without interruption, until well after dark. At which point he returns home

to begin the process all over again. "Fun?" laughs an old friend. "Bobby Inman has no fun."

Upon first meeting, Inman can seem aloof, almost cold. He is much warmer with friends—likable, engaging, considerate of sensibilities—but even then, there is a distance, a sort of enforced remoteness, as if he's constantly calculating who around him can be told what. It can be unsettling. A man who has known him for years and, like so many others, still claims not to know him well, admits: "You know as much about Bobby Inman as Bobby Inman wants you to know, and that is damned little."

Intelligence accounts for some of the isolation. Inman has spent most of his adult lifetime keeping people from knowing things. But it is the other intelligence, the one spelled with a small *I*, that keeps him truly separate. His brain is an intimidating storehouse, crammed with every imaginable fact, and, according to every recollection, it always has been. Back in Texas, they still remember that Bobby Inman was one of the renowned radio "Quiz Kids," dazzling adults every week with intellectual pyrotechnics. Give him an impossible equation and, *whir*, he'd solve it. Ask after a fact and, *zingo*, he'd give it to you. The capital of Mongolia? The date of the Council of Trent? The coefficient of the square root of nine over pi? Bobby knew them all—and a lot more besides. He seemed to read everything in sight, which was not unusual for a bright boy in a small town where, after feeding the hogs after supper, there was not much else to do. What was unusual was that he never seemed to forget any of it. He could repeat, verbatim, whole passages of obscure tomes he had digested years before. It was as if his mind were an IBM 360 on which the terminals never closed, and watching it work, all clickety-clack, like some giant parlor trick run amuck, got to be a little frightening.

He must have had few playmates. While visions of playing football for A&M danced in the other boys' heads, young Bobby was off at the library. He was skinny and four-eyed and awkward and along the way, a lot of sand probably got kicked in his face. But it paid off. Because when he got to be an adult, the other boys weren't frightened, they were awed. "I'd tell you he has a photographic memory," says one of them, a senior White House aide, "but it's better than that. A photograph takes time to develop. Inman's like a Polaroid. Instant." They still wanted to test him, though, just as they had on the radio every week: Spell the name of the prime minister of Sri Lanka, Daniel Patrick Moynihan challenged during a Senate hearing.

beat. "Mr. P-R-E-M-A-D-A-S-A is the prime minister," he shot back, allowing himself a small, self-satisfied smile, "and Mr. J-A-Y-E-W-A-R-D-E-N-E is the president."

The Navy, fortunately, values such recall, and Inman's climb up the career ladder was m-e-t-e-o-r-i-c. After a wartime tour of sea duty aboard the aircraft carrier Valley Forge, Inman held a series of increasingly important assignments: assistant naval attaché, U. S. Embassy, Stockholm; executive assistant, Vice-Chief of Naval Operations; chief intelligence briefer, CINC-PAC; director, Naval Intelligence; vice-director, Defense Intelligence; director, National Security Agency. His superiors groomed and fussed over him like a prize pupil who, because of his oddity, threatened none of their careers. And so, almost invisibly, he continued to rise.

The turning point came in 1973, during the Yom Kippur war. The outbreak of the war, which initially sent the Israelis reeling back from the Suez Canal, caught U. S. intelligence flat-footed, and, as the battling continued, there was a mad scramble to come up with hard information. At issue was not only the disposition of the Arab armies but also the intentions of the Soviet Union. Inman, then intelligence briefer to the Vice-Chief of Naval Operations, supplied the critical piece of the puzzle. What the piece was remains, even now, secret, but a good guess is that it involved Soviet plans to dispatch two combat divisions to Syria at the height of the conflict. "Everyone else in the community was calling it one way," recalls one admiral. "Bobby was the only one calling it the other. Bobby was the one who was right."

The Soviets, after threats by Richard Nixon, abandoned their plans, and the correctness of Inman's analysis eventually helped win him appointment as director of Naval Intelligence. It was there that he encountered the redoubtable Edwin Wilson, CIA man, shipper of arms, recruiter of assassins.

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Military intelligence, and Naval Intelligence in particular, is a formidable undertaking, involving the tracking not only of potential enemies but of actual allies as well. In the Navy, much of the latter task fell to a shadowy operation dubbed Task Force 157.

Created in the late Sixties, at the height of the antiwar movement, Task Force 157 was perhaps the most clandestine of all military intelligence's operations. Its members wore no uniforms and were outside the regular Navy chain of command. Their cover took various forms. Some operators ran dummy civilian companies. Others, such as a yeoman

of Henry Kissinger's, worked within the White House and, without Presidential knowledge, spied on the Government itself. Just who they were spying for was always difficult to say. For while the task force was a Navy operation, it was heavily infiltrated by CIA. The Navy yeoman, for instance, was a CIA man; like the other members of Task Force 157, he officially did not exist. So secret was the task force, so sensitive was its mission, that, until a group of its former agents brought suit against the Government demanding pension rights, the Navy refused to acknowledge that there had ever been such a thing.

The task force was real enough, though, and so was the now infamous CIA man Wilson, who was then running one of the task force's fronts, an equally real civilian corporation called Around World Shipping and Forwarding. Around World's legal business was freight handling, and among the items it shipped, quite illegally, were 20 tons of plastique explosive to Libya. But that wasn't Wilson's only enterprise; he boasted of holding controlling interest in more than 100 corporations. The companies laundered spy money for the Navy, secured sophisticated electronics gear, entertained Congressmen, monitored Soviet nuclear-bomb shipments and, according to published reports, helped destabilize the left-wing government of Australian prime minister Gough Whitlam. There was very little, in fact, that Task Force 157 did not do. According to subsequent investigations by *The Washington Post* and the *Wilmington News Journal*, Task Force 157 was involved in almost every major intelligence operation from 1968 until 1975, from overthrowing Salvador Allende in Chile to helping Kissinger fly secretly to Peking in 1971.

Inman put an end to it. The chain of events began in 1975, shortly after Inman's appointment as director of Naval Intelligence. Early that year, Inman appeared before Senator John McClellan's Defense Appropriations Subcommittee and, afterward, a senior committee staffer invited him to lunch. Inman accepted and at the restaurant they were joined by Wilson, who announced, "I work for you, Admiral." Inman was surprised, but not nearly so much as when Wilson went on to tell him that he would have an easier time securing money on the Hill if he steered contracts to Wilson's companies.

There were never any contracts. When he went back to his office that afternoon, Inman ordered an investigation of Wilson instead. It took a year to untangle all of Wilson's various connections and, even then, whom he was working for and precisely what he was doing were

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far from clear. What was obvious was that Wilson was, in Inman's words, "a petty grafter . . . a 'five percenter.'" With that pronouncement, Inman fired him. Inman disbanded Task Force 157 altogether when he discovered a few months later that Wilson had been using it to recruit assassins on behalf of Libya. "I closed it down," Inman said of the task force, "because it was out of control and because its continued operation was a drain on Navy resources."

The explanation was vintage Inman, a bit of idealism—"out of control"—laden with a heaping helping of pragmatism: "drain on Navy resources." It was the same combination he used to rationalize his opposition to CIA's domestic spying. He feared for civil liberties—"rules to protect Americans"—yes, and he was worried about efficiency, too. Keeping track of protesters was expensive. It took one's eye off the ball. Worst of all, the press invariably found out, and *that*, as Inman ruefully put it, "keeps us from doing the job we were meant to do."

You had to trim like that if you were a spook, or you wouldn't stay a spook for very long. It was all right to come off like an A.C.L.U. member in private, to silently signal Senators that what they were hearing from Reagan's boys was crazy. The important thing was not being too out-front publicly. You had to be a member of "the team," as the faceless men of the agency called themselves, and there were rules by which the team played. It was a dicey business sometimes, sorting out who you were from what you believed, and for Bobby Inman, going to NSA was the dickest business of all.

The National Security Agency is one of those agencies your Government would prefer that you not know about. The joke in Washington is that its initials stand for Never Say Anything, and, in practice, NSA doesn't say much. It is listed in no Government handbook. It is uniquely exempt from the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act. What it does, how many people it employs, the amount of dollars it spends are all classified. Even the executive order Harry Truman signed 30 years ago bringing it into existence remains an official secret.

The agency is headquartered in a modern, three-story building 15 miles outside Washington on the grounds of Fort Meade, Maryland. To discourage the casually curious, two chain-link, TV-monitored fences, each topped by six strands of electrified barbed wire, surround it. The people who pass through its portals (some 20,000 men and women)

—a force larger than that of CIA—backed by another 100,000 military personnel at 2000 "listening posts" throughout the world) are a tight-lipped group. They are forbidden to discuss their work, even with their spouses. To ensure that they don't, they are subject to regular polygraph examinations that ask them to list the names and addresses of people with whom they have had sex, as well as whether or not they are acquainted with the meaning of the word *fellatio*.

What NSA does is snoop. "They've got a huge vacuum cleaner turned on," says one authority on the agency, "sucking in information around the world. Whatever goes out over the airwaves—from a Soviet radar pulse over Novosibirsk, to an Arab diplomat calling home to Riyadh about the price of oil, to a Panamanian infantry captain radioing his company to switch position—gets sucked up in the vacuum cleaner." And that, as it turned out, was the trouble. For among the billions of bits of information NSA routinely collected were the private conversations of ordinary Americans—and some not so ordinary ones, as well. For years, NSA was an unseen third party to all the phone calls made by Jane Fonda, Dr. Spock and 1678 other Americans on the agency's "watch list." NSA also read all overseas telegrams and thoughtfully distributed copies of the most interesting to other Government agencies. That particular program, code-named Operation Shamrock, went on for 18 years.

It all came to an end during the Watergate investigations. When the Nixon tapes were played, three initials kept popping up: NSA. From the way Nixon and his friends talked about it—twice as much, by one count, as CIA—NSA seemed capable of almost anything. The more the Congressmen listened, the closer that seemed to the truth. Around Capitol Hill and in the press, there was growing pressure to bring NSA to heel. Enter the fixer, Bobby Inman.

Inman's touch with Congress was already well known. The Navy thought so much of his skills it had already given him a medal—the Distinguished Service Medal, its highest noncombatant decoration—simply for the quality of his Congressional testimony. It was odd about that medal, and odd about the way Inman won it; by accepted standards, he did almost everything wrong.

The average military officer who went up to the Hill, you see, was a practiced politician. He played the angles. He backslapped. He drank bourbon and branch water with the bulls in their hideaway offices. When he testified, which was something to be avoided, a

train of impedimenta trailed behind him. There were squadrons of junior colonels whispering off mike in his ear; briefcases bulging with every possible contingency, set-piece formulas for Just the Right Answer. To get it, a Congressman had to ask Just the Right Question, and even then, of course, he didn't get much. Whole careers were made on the fine art of evasion. That was the established norm.

But Inman wasn't normal. He didn't drink and he didn't backslap. He did go into the hideaway offices, but it wasn't to chat about what the Redskins had done the previous weekend. Instead, he'd stretch out his long legs, lean back, rub the bridge of his nose in weariness and talk geopolitics. He'd discuss where the world was going the next 20 years, and where it ought to be going. He'd talk about the Russians, dispassionately, analytically, trying to put himself in their shoes. And he'd talk about intelligence—NSA's and that of the other agencies. There wouldn't be James Bond stories, but the nuts and bolts of the craft: how more linguistics experts needed to be recruited; how CIA's "generation gap," as he called it, needed to be closed; how the "data product" could be improved. He could be startlingly honest—"That's pretty dumb," he said of one operation, "but we're going to do it anyway"—and, in his honesty, he'd recruit converts to his side.

If he had a political ideology, it was a mystery to the men who questioned him. Goldwater liked him, and so did John Tower, which was to be expected. Inman was, after all, a man of arms. What was not expected, what was truly astounding, was how the liberals, the Senators like Joe Biden and Daniel K. Inouye and Birch Bayh, who munched on CIA directors like cornflakes, not only liked him but adored him. Their regard for him was almost embarrassing, and in certain quarters in Washington, it was said that all the adulation actually *hurt* Inman. When Biden heard that he offered to call Inman "a no-good, son-of-a-bitch horse's ass" if it would help his career, but Inman didn't seem worried. About Congress there was no reason to worry during those years he was running NSA, because Inman had a secret. A friend, a former CIA director, told what it was: "Bobby," he said, "understands information. He knows it is power. He knows how to use it."

It was hypnotic to watch. There he would be on a hearing day, utterly alone. No aides whispering conversations, no briefing books at his side, the green baize of the witness table stretching out before him like an empty ocean. The gavel would bang and the distinguished Sen-

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ator from somewhere would ask a question. And then it would happen: A smile would come over Inman's face as if, cartoonlike, a light bulb had been turned on in his head. "Well, yes, sir," he would begin, and two tight paragraphs later, the Senator would have what he had been after, with maybe a lesson in Russian history or English literature in the bargain. If the question had been less than wise, as questions in Congress tended to be, the Senator would never know it. This was not Stans Turner, who belittled them, or Dick Helms, who condescended to them; this was good ol' Bobby Inman, who simply informed them. It seemed so effortless, no one ever guessed at the pressure; only his left leg, crossed casually over the right, gave him away. When he was bored, it had a habit of swinging from side to side.

The press was entranced. It was hard not to be when, as was his wont at NSA, he was lunching with them in their offices, taking them home to breakfast and, ever so nicely, asking them not to write this story or that. NSA directors had never done that before; no spook ever had. And they had suffered for it. Inman was different. When Inman talked, reporters listened. There were certain rules, of course: You never named him; you never attributed the tidbits he gave you; you never, in fact, did anything he didn't want you to do. or the invitations to breakfast stopped coming. That was a capital game, and Inman played it with consummate skill. During his time at NSA, exposés of the agency all but disappeared.

Inman's ability to play the press was on display—along with his slashing wit—at the 1977 Gridiron Dinner. The annual black-tie, off-the-record soiree is an important event on the Washington social calendar, a once-a-year opportunity for pols and press to put aside the adversary relationship that supposedly exists between them. The topic of the 1977 dinner was intelligence, and Inman, then director of NSA, was in top form. Gazing out over the Washington Hilton ballroom, where were collected some of the senior powers of American journalism, he noted that, according to recent press reports, some of those in attendance had been picking up pin money as operatives for the CIA. That was a shame, Inman said, since CIA was such a ham-handed, stingy employer. Then, smile broadening, he continued: "We in the Pentagon want to make it up to you. Join us and you can be in the big money. We've got 120 billion dollars a year to spend. They skimped on expenses. With us, you'll have unvouch-

ered funds, double-dipping and lots of fringe benefits. Duckhunting trips. PX privileges. Cheap booze at officers' clubs. Free alcohol treatment at VA hospitals. And your dishonorable discharge upgraded. If your editor won't pay for the assignment, we'll give you a free ride with Lockheed. If you have to get there fast, we have a few B-1 prototypes. Not to mention Trident submarine rides for the kiddies."

The reporters, who were to write few critical stories about NSA thereafter, lapped it up. CIA director Stansfield Turner, also in attendance, did not seem as amused.

Turner was not the only one who wasn't happy. In a town like Washington, where there are always wheels within wheels, there were those who thought that Inman's technique—his courting of the Congress, his petting of the press—was merely a ploy: there were those who believed that, in seeming so honest, Inman was actually being devious. As it happened, many of those people worked for the Central Intelligence Agency.

CIA had suffered at Inman's hands, both during his tenure at Naval Intelligence and later while he was at NSA, where he had become embroiled in a bureaucratic cat fight with Turner over the agency's independence. Turner, whose arrogance was exceeded only by his ambition, had wanted to bring NSA directly under his command, and Inman, after months of battling, had successfully thwarted him. The incident was notable, if only because it was one of the few times Inman had ever been seen to lose his temper. Whether by calculation or not, during his fight with Turner, he had done so several times. Tables were pounded, faces turned red, angry words were exchanged; and, as a result, Turner, an immensely proud man, had never forgiven Inman.

Matters were not improved when NSA intercepts later picked up word of Billy Carter's financial dealings with the Libyans. Rather than take the information to Turner, Inman, as provided by statute, went instead to Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti—then quietly briefed the press about what he had done. Turner was wounded again when, during the controversy over the presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba, the Defense Department, fearful that CIA was using news of the brigade as a stratagem to undermine SALT, pointedly checked the agency's data with Inman. Enraged, Turner reportedly went to Jimmy Carter, his old friend and Annapolis classmate, looking for Inman's head. Instead, Carter awarded Inman the National Security Medal.

It was against this backdrop that word began to circulate in late 1980 that Inman was being pushed as the next director of Central Intelligence. Doing the pushing was Barry Goldwater, and the incoming Reaganites were not at all happy. They had their candidate—Reagan campaign director William Casey, a 68-year-old former OSS man who had headed the Securities and Exchange Commission under Nixon. And while Casey suffered from certain admitted defects—lapses in memory, inability to organize and, as time would demonstrate, a studied cavalieress with other people's money—he was at least not Inman. Inman they despised. He was a Carter appointee. He was popular with Congress and the press. He had even—and this raised hackles most of all—allowed a fag to stay at NSA.

This last charge was indisputably true. In mid-1980, as the Moral Majority was beginning its intimidation campaign, a routine security check had found a middle-level NSA employee to be a homosexual. Within the intelligence community, that had always been cause for instant dismissal, the rationale being that homosexuals were vulnerable to blackmail. That was the recommendation in this case, but Inman overrode it. After he informed the man's family, and thus removed the potential for compromise, the employee was allowed to stay on with no diminution of his security clearance. The CIA "old boys," were beside themselves, and, by the time he took office, so, reportedly, was Reagan's then national-security advisor, Richard V. Allen. Allen had big plans for the agency. In the word of the day, it was going to be "unleashed," and the loosening of its bonds and the attendant nasties therein would require tough-minded, hard-charging men. The worry was that Inman was soft.

There remained, though, the problem of Goldwater, who was lobbying fast and furiously for Inman's appointment. Also, someone had to backstop Casey, especially on the Hill. The sop solution was to offer Inman the number-two post, deputy director.

Inman was not sure he wanted it. He was content at NSA, he told friends, and, if he did leave, it would probably be for private industry, where, reportedly, offers in the \$250,000 range were being dangled. His sons were approaching college age. With his military career at its apparent zenith, he was tempted to accept one of the lucrative offers. Friends, such as James Schlesinger, himself a former CIA director, urged him to turn the appointment down. Inman was on the verge of taking their advice when Reagan summoned him to the White House. After an application of the famous Reagan star, Admiral Inman changed his mind.

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Since then, he has not had an easy time of it. During the controversy over the financial dealings of Casey's deputy for covert operations, a California businessman named Max Hugel, Inman was suspected of leaking the information that eventually brought about Hugel's downfall. The stories about the source of the leaks were untrue, but that did not prevent further suspicions that Inman—"a sleeper agent," as one of his enemies called him—was behind Goldwater's call for Casey's resignation, when the CIA director landed in a financial briar patch of his own. At one point, when it appeared that Casey was on the verge of being ousted, security advisor Allen let it be known that if Casey went, Inman would go with him.

The Casey flap finally passed, but not before Inman was compelled to go on national television and, looking distinctly uncomfortable, commend his boss for doing "a great job." But that was not a sufficient show of good faith for the political right and, during the battle over CIA's proposed executive order, they went at Inman again. *Human Events*, the influential right-wing journal, warned ominously of unidentified "liberals" lurking within CIA's corridors, and *The Wall Street Journal*, in an editorial widely believed to have been generated by the White House, invited

Inman to make good on his pledge about "personally repugnant" executive orders and resign. About that time, CIA spokesmen started talking about Inman's "keeping a low profile."

He has rarely been seen since. The few times he has ventured out, it has not been as the Bobby Inman of old. With Casey keeping cover, he has become the agency's point man, the anointed bearer of bad tidings. He was there when Reagan finally signed the agency's executive order; there again when the agency decided to crack down on civilian scientists, warning them of the legal trouble that awaited them for disclosing sensitive technology; and he was there yet again to defend the widespread use of Government polygraphing.

For his diminishing circle of friends, it has all been very unsettling. "It's bad," a Senator said recently, referring to the executive order that Reagan signed and Inman defended. He mentioned the White House ceremony, Inman standing there, looking rather blank, assuring everyone that the revised version was really going to be all right, that they could go to sleep at night and not worry, because he had kept the genie in the bottle. The Senator, an admirer of Inman's, recalled how, at that moment, those wheels within wheels spun again, and how this time he found himself wondering whether maybe they were right. "It's bad," he repeated. "But without Bobby, it would have been a hell of a lot worse."

Was it true? Had Bobby really become Horatius at the bridge? Or was he someone else, entirely, someone darker, and different?

It certainly *seems* that Inman's role now is to keep the bad things from getting worse, and it is a part he performs without much conviction. At the meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, where he called for voluntary censorship, his words seemed flat, their syntax tortured and stumbling. The gap-toothed smile was there, as always, but now it seemed more forced, the man behind it more fatalistic. When he told the assembled scientists of a storm that was coming, how their way of life would be washed away if they did not bend before it, he seemed to some of his listeners to be speaking as much of himself as he was of them. His audience looked back at him. A friend in attendance shook his head sadly.

No one in Washington can be certain now what will become of the agency or of Inman. People can only talk and speculate and wonder and worry. But they can be sure that, whatever comes to pass in the shadowy world he inhabits, Bobby Inman will be thinking... always thinking.

